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No discreet study of the Spanish voyages of discovery 
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Most immediately, the 1770's expeditions sought to 
establish a legally tenable Spanish presence on the 
northwest coast to thwart perceived foreign--especially 
Russian and British--designs. Viceroy Bucareli's detailed 
instructions reflected these concerns. The mariners--Juan 
Perez, Bruno de Hezeta, Juan Francisco de la Bodega y 
Quadra, and Ignacio Arteaga--were successful in fulfilling 
their orders to varying degrees and for different reasons, 
historians have argued. 
By examining the extant literature on the earlier--
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries--voyages to the 
northwest littoral, one can delineate other, culturally 
determined continuities between the impetuses behind the 
early voyages and those of the 1770's. Curiously, this 
linkage has gone unnoticed by historians. 
The Bucareli-directed expeditions have been examined by 
scholars tangentially, as parts of other studies. The body 
of literature is not immodest; the conclusions reached are 
mixed. Few of the studies rely on primary research, and many 
simply relay the ''facts'' without syntheses. The more 
direct investigations, typically focused on the 1790's 
Nootka Sound controversy which brought Spain and Britain to 
the brink of war, fashion narrative structures into which 
the Bucareli-directed expeditions serve as ''setting.'' 
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CHAPTER I 
PRELUDE TO THE SPANISH LAKE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the Spanish 
expeditions to the northwest coast of North America that 
sailed during Viceroy Antonio Maria Bucareli y Ursua's 
administration, 1771-1779. In order to achieve this aim 
several factors, apart from the voyages per se, must first 
be addressed. Chapter I explores the linkage that existed 
between the initial expeditions to the northwest littoral in 
the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and those 
under Bucareli's direction in the 1770's. This chapter also 
examines the socio-cultural context in which the early 
northward thrust occurred, that is, a purview of the salient 
elements of Hapsburg rule of the Spanish empire. 
Chapter II introduces the key players promoting the 
1770's expeditions, Viceroy Bucareli and Visitador Jose de 
Galvez. These two prominent figures require placement within 
the context of the Enlightenment, of which they were a part 
and product; thus, the transition between Hapsburg and 
Bourbon rule of Spain's empire is fundamental, as are the 
steps Bucareli and Galvez took with regard to the northwest 
coast. The final elements of the socio-cultural linkage 
tying the Bucareli-directed expedidtions t0 the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries were three apocryphal forays into 
the Northwest Passage, reputedly sailed between 1588 and 
1640. 
The courses of the expeditions--Juan Perez in 1774, 
Bruno de Hezeta and Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra in 
1775, and Ignacio Arteaga and Bodega y Quadra in 1779--and 
what they accomplished, are traced in Chapter III. These 
narratives require some explanation of Bucareli's detailed 
instructions for the sailors, especially with regard to 
possession-taking. 
The penultimate chapter of this study examines how 
historians writing in English have evaluated the 
expeditions, and why. Bodega, for example, has been praised 
enthusiastically by virtually ~ll northwest scholars, while 
Perez has been both vilified and lauded. Following Chapter 
IV a series of observations conclude the text of this work. 
EARLY VOYAGES 
Spain's interest in the northwest coast of North 
America which spanned from the sixteenth through eighteenth 
centuries, has received considerable notice by historians 
writing in the English language. However, the pivotal first 
voyages of the eighteenth century that returned Spanish 
influence to the region after almost two centuries of 
neglect sailed during the viceregal administration of 
Antonio Bucareli C1771-1779l, and have curiously remained 
relatively unstudied as a discreet topic of inquiry. 
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How history has treated the mariners of the Bucareli 
years is of especial importance because Spanish territorial 
claims to the northwest coast that drew the Iberian nation 
to the brink of war with Britain in the early 1790's in 
large part derived from the accomplishments of these 
expeditions. Spain's backing away from its claims to 
absolute sovereignty to avoid conflict with its long-time 
rival effectively signaled the end of Spanish efforts to 
secure the region. 
History has generally measured the successes of the 
voyages in the context of the Spanish attempt to protect the 
coast and the hinterland it sheltered from foreign 
encroachments. The more general impetuses behind Spain's 
northward thrust in the 1770's reached back hundreds of 
years to the essential reasons that led Spain to discover 
and conquer the New World, but for the most part they have 
not been discussed in the literature. Yet the general causal 
factors engendering the Bucareli expeditions largely 
mirrored those behind the earliest voyages of the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. 
The story of the Spanish presence on the Pacific coast 
of North America logically begins with its discovery by 
Vasco Nunez de Balboa who sighted the world's largest body 
of water from its western shores in 1513. Balboa, like 
Hernan Cortes and Francisco Pizarro a native of the Spanish 
province of Extremadura, had only recently united the failed 
colonies in Panama and northern Colombia (1509-1511) when 
3 
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tales of a land fabulously rich in gold reached him. 1 A true 
conqaistador Balboa was moved to lead an expedition across 
the isthmus where, he had been assured, he would encounter a 
great sea, beyond which to the south lay a land of riches 
CPeru). 2 Of course, Balboa never arrived there; in fact, his 
accomplishment as being the first European to see the 
Pacific from its western shore provoked the envy of 
Pedrarias Davila, his father-in-law and governor of the 
Panamanian isthmus, who ordered Balboa to be tried, 
condemned, and beheaded in 1519. 
After Hernan Cortes, first chief of the Conquest of 
Mexico, had largely subdued the Aztec confederacy in the 
1520's, he turned his rapacious appetite to the Pacific 
coast. As de facto governor of New Spain he outfitted 
several expeditions to reconnoiter northerly waters. In 1532 
native Americans on the Sinaloa coast massacred the first of 
these parties, led by Diego Hurtado de Mendoza. 3 A second 
expedition consisting of two ships--the first of which 
''turned back before accomplishing anything of 
importance'' 4 --mutinied and killed the captain of the latter 
1 For the sake of clarity and readability all place 
names employed will those presently used. 
2 This point should properly stand as conjectural: the 
Indians often lied to the invaders with the hope that they 
would simply go away. See Clarence Haring, The Spanish 
Empire in the America CNew York: Oxford University Press, 
1947). 
~ Maurice G. Holmes, From New Spain by Sea to the 
Californias CGlendale: The Arthur H. Clarke Co., 1963) 57-
58. 
vessel. The voyage managed to continue under the capable 
hand of its former pilot, Fortun Jimenez. Yet this 
exploration, like that of Hurtado de Mendoza, ended 
tragically when native Americans killed most of its crew in 
the vicinity of La Paz, at the south end of the Baja 
peninsula. More importantly, the survivors returned with 
fabricated stories of gold and pearls.s Thus, in 1535 Cortes 
himself sailed north, landing near La Paz, only to shortly 
return to Mexico empty-handed. 6 This expedition, moreover, 
encountered considerable difficulty in actually reaching 
Baja California: 23 men died of starvation. 7 
Meanwhile, other chimerical tales of riches in distant 
lands fueled a predisposition among circles in the viceregal 
capital, Mexico City, to substitute fantasy for reality. For 
example, rumors of the heralded metropolis of Cibola, one of 
seven such purported cities rich in gold, silver, and 
emeralds, encouraged Cortes to deploy three subsequent 
expeditions up the coast. 0 In 1539 Francisco de Ulloa led 
the most noteworthy early expedition to the end of the Bay 
~ Warren Cook, Flood Tide of Empire CNew Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1973) 2. 
!!» Coc•k, 5 · 
~See Holmes's chapter, ''To California with Cortes,'' 
12-30. 
7 John W. Caughey, California CNew York: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1'340) 53. 
e According to a legend, after the eighth century 
Moslem invasion of Iberia, seven Portuguese bishops fled to 
the west and founded the enchanted cities of Cibola. Paul 
Horgan, Conquistadors in North ~merican History <New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Company, 1963): 115-16. 
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of California, thereby demonstrating the coastline's 
contiguity and that Baja California formed a peninsula. 
Oddly enough, royal officials and other explorers ignored 
this information, choosing instead to believe it was an 
island, until its ''re-discovery'' by Padre Eusebio Kino in 
1701. And it was not until 1746 that royal officials 
declared California no es isla pero es tierra firme.~ 
Additionally, Maurice Holmes maintains that Ulloa, after 
rounding Cabo San Lucas, sailed as far north as present-day 
San Diego. Warren Cook, among others, 10 tempers this claim 
in asserting the voyage passed no further than 30 degrees 
North latitude CSan Diego is located at about 33 degrees 
North). Writing in the late nineteenth century, Hubert Howe 
Bancroft in a seminal w0rk largely shrugs off the voyage as 
altogether devoid of any substantive historical importance, 
except with regard to the ''forgotten'' yet accurate 
discovery that Baja California formed a peninsula, not an 
island. 11 
9 Irving B. Richman, California Under Spain and Mexico 
(New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1965) 59. 
10 See Henry R. Wagner, Spanish Voyages to the 
NorthHest Coast of America in the Sixteenth Century (San 
Francisco: California Historical Society, 1929) 14. Holmes's 
calculation was clearly taken from the official journals of 
the voyage. Wagner's work, however, in the minds of 
virtually all authoritative recent accounts transcends the 
veracity of sixteenth century nautical instruments. It is 
somewhat surprising that Holmes chooses the original, given 
the quality of his study and the stature of Wagner's 
cartographical corrections. 
11 Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of the North Mexican 
States, XV (San Francisco, 188-) 79. 
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The Seven Cities tales inspired Viceroy Antonio de 
Mendoza12 to send an expedition north on the coast in 1540, 
primarily to support Francisco Vasquez de Coronado's 
overland venture. Three vessels fitted at Acapulco and led 
by Hernando de Alarcon sailed up the Gulf of California 
where, apart from exploring the Colorado River, they waited 
in vain for a signal from Coronado. In November of 1540 the 
party returned to port in Colima, as its orders 
stipulated.1:a 
After one failed mission in 1542, later that same 
season Juan Rodriguez Cabrillo sailed northward on Viceroy 
Mendoza's orders to search for the Northwest Passage. 
Cabrillo met with no luck, but he traversed the coast as far 
as San Francisco without, however, espying the bay. 14 
Cabrillo died before the voyage concluded, and to add insult 
to injury, the accomplishment of having sailed so far north 
was hushed-up, in keeping with the official Spanish penchant 
for secrecy. Such policies would be significant with regard 
to later voyages. 
12 Mendoza's arrival in 1535 officially supplanted 
Cortes's authority, although since the late 1520's a royal 
body, the Rudencia, technically wielded the highest 
manifestation of Spanish regal authority. See Haring, 
passim. 
1 !al Holmes, 92-'38. 
14 While it may seem curious that one could sail to or 
past San Francisco without espying the bay, such is the 
Pacific coastline. With some regularity prominent features 
of the littoral were often past unnoticed. Both Cook and 
Wagner attribute the phenomenon to endemic foggy weather and 
to a reluctance of mariners to stray too close to shore. 
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The next important incursion into northern Pacific 
waters was not by a Spaniard at all but rather by an 
Englishman, the redoubtable Sir Francis Drake, who set sail 
in 1577 with a complement of five ships, with he himself 
commanding from the 180 ton Golden Hind, the only vessel 
that survived the expedition. Two aspects of his expedition 
are relevant to this study. First, the intrepid knight 
seaman rounded Cape Horn and subsequently both raided 
Spanish coastal settlements and seized the Manila Galleon. 
Spanish authorities clearly and understandably took alarm at 
the seeming ease with which Drake operated. Second, his 
mission, like Cabrillo's, had orders to search for the 
Northwest Passage and, to that end, met with no more success 
than the unfortunate Spanish mariner. 
THE MANILA GALLEON 
Spain established the Manila Galleon, an annual trade 
convoy running between Manila and Acapulco, in 1565, 44 
years after Ferdinand Magellan claimed the Philippine 
Islands in the name of the Spanish Crown. Magellan, a 
disaffected Portuguese mariner, had thrown in his lot with 
Spain in 1517 and while in its employ became not only the 
first to navigate the treacherous waters of Cape Horn but 
the first to circumnavigate the planet. 1 ~ 
1 ~ William Lytle Schurz, The Manila Galleon CNew York: 
E.P. Dutton~~ Co., Inc., 1'339) 17-18. See also the chapter 
titled, ~ qhe Manila Gallei:•n,'' in Richman, 12-30. 
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Following Magellan's return to Spain in 1522 several 
expeditions--including those of Garcias Jofre de Loaysa in 
1525, and Sebastian Cabot in 1526--attempted to retrace his 
route, without success. In 1542 six ships duplicated the 
feat, but accomplished ''nothing lasting.'' 16 Not until 1564 
did colonial officials determine that annual trade with the 
islands constituted both a desirable end and a feasible 
goal. Of voyages averaging six months duration the service 
shuttled goods to and from the islands and Mexico, many of 
which eventually reached Spain. 
The fright given Spanish authorities by Drake's 
exploits compounded the fact that until 1579 the Galleon had 
been without--indeed, without the need for--any protection. 
Spain's considerable success in largely hiding the trade's 
existence goes a long way toward explaining its 
preoccupation with maintaining strict secrecy about these 
voyages. 17 
SEARCH FOR THE STRAIT OF ANIAN 
Drake's quest to find the Northwest Passage mirrors a 
similar ongoing Spanish colonial preoccupation. More 
commonly known as the Strait of Anian, the passage reputedly 
linked the two great oceans, Atlantic and Pacific. 
Desperately sought by the geographically disadvantaged 
16 Richman, 13. 
17 See Cook, 7. 
·::i 
English--and by all her European rivals--a strict economic 
imperative guided the search for the elusive strait: 
The importance of transoceanic transport for the 
importation of commercial products from the Orient 
was due to the fact that carriage by land in the 
sixteenth century, as today, was very costly; and 
so slow as to impair the quality of these 
products, chief of which were spices, while in 
transit .•• It was estimated at Venice that products 
costing a ducat in the Far East became worth from 
seventy to one hundred ducats when they arrived 
there. By the time they reached the western 
extremities of Europe the cost was still further 
increased; thus it is no wonder that both the 
English and the French merchants were eager to 
find an all-water route free from Spanish and 
Portuguese interferences. 1 s 
In what proved to be horrifying for Spain, in 1587 
Thomas Cavendish successfully duplicated Drake's looting of 
the galleon. Spanish authorities immediately imagined that 
Cavendish--and, by extrapolation, pirates in general--had 
found and had begun to ply the Strait of Anian. This fear 
and two other factors fundamentally convinced Spain to 
return to the northern coast. First, the galleons and their 
crews had long suffered because the overladen vessels spent 
so long at sea that both ships and sailors literally gave 
out--sinking and dying with devastating regularity. 
Settlements on the northwest coast might ameliorate these 
abysmal conditions since typically the galleon first sighted 
land hundreds of miles north of Acapulco near Cape Blanco, 
California; thus, settlements in Alta California could 
relieve some of the pressures wrought by overlong stays at 
1 g T.A. Rickland, ''The Strait of Anian,'' British 
Columbia Historical Quarterly 5 C1941l: 161-62. 
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sea: rotting timbers might be replaced, or scurvy could be 
treated. Second, the new viceroy, Luis de Velasco (1590-95), 
''exceeded his predecessors in zeal for discovering this 
passage.'' 1'9 
John Cabot's voyage to Cape Breton Island on Canada's 
east coast in 1497 aroused the earliest interest in the 
passage. The idea first appeared in print in 1527, and by 
1540 mapmaker Sebastian Munster had drawn a facsimile of the 
putative strait. A Flemish cartographer, Abraham Ortelius, 
created the second such map, said to be of Italian origin. 
These earliest purported set of directions point to the 
remarkable fecundity of the human imagination: Munster's 
theory rested on America being an island separated by water 
at its northern coast from two other large isles; 20 Ortelius 
followed a more traditional approach and fancied the passage 
an actual sea-lane along the northern fringes of a single 
continent, North America. 21 Subsequent claims pointed both 
north and south. Drake's voyage, of course, demonstrated 
that no southern passage e~isted. So, literally, given the 
19 Cook, 10. As noted, Drake also sought the strait, 
however, he turned away from the North~2bt coast officially 
at 48 degrees North latitude. There has been some debate as 
to the veracity of this ''official'' claim, first published 
in 1628. Wagner, for example, compellingly argues that Drake 
turned out to sea at a point no further north than 43 
degrees. Moreover, Cook charges, the English claim was 
purposely doctored for political reasons. See Henry R. 
Wagner, Sir Francis Drake's Voyage Rround the Horld: Its 
Rims and Rchievements CSan Francisco: California Historical 
Society Press, 1926) 135-43. See also Cook, 7-8. 
2C> Wagner, Spanish Voyages, 35'3. 
~:l Rick land, 166. 
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nature of the speculation, mapmakers returned to their 
instruments and their imaginations. 
Not unexpectedly Spanish authorities were not immune to 
the persuasive powers of such notions, and, as noted, by the 
early 1590's had urgent reasons for a northward thrust both 
of exploration and of limited settlement. Where Cortes had 
sought riches, more glory, and potential Christian converts-
-for he was a pious man2~--the newer impetuses, while not 
blind to these lures, were more defensive in scope: 
essentially colonial officials wanted to protect a good 
thing, and, additionally, if possible acquire more of it. 
But, primarily the hope for a new, safe, stop-over port 
engendered the next visit to the northwest littoral. 23 
Sebastiao Rodrigues Cermenho directed the galleon to 
Manila in 1594 and on his return sailed as far north on the 
American coastline as about 30 miles south of the 42nd 
parallel, the California-Oregon Border. 24 He later landed 
22 With trenchant accuracy Cortes immodestly recorded: 
''I have toiled without cease for 40 years, eating poorly, 
through times good and bad •.• placing myself in danger, 
spending my fortune and my life, all in the service of God. 
I brought sheep into His fold in unknown lands ••• while 
gaining for myself appropriate wealth and esteem.'' Cited in 
Peggy K. Liss, Mexico Under Spain, 1521-1556 (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1975): 21. 
23 The ensuing voyages of Sebastiao Rodrigues Cermenho 
and Sebastiano Vizcaino may have been influenced by yet 
another mythical tale--the voyage of Juan de Fuca in 1592 to 
the strait bearing his name. Fuca claimed to have found, 
entered, then returned from the passageway at a latitude 
almost exactly where the Straits of Juan de Fuca now exist. 
Whether or not Fuca's voyage actually took place has been a 
matter of some controversy, which will be discussed in 
Chapter II. See Cook, 22-31. 
1.-, ..:.. 
near Drake's Bay, California, and formally took possession 
for the Spanish Crown. 2~ While ashore the landing party 
witnessed the ship's destruction by a squall. Incredibly, 
the 70 or so survivors continued in the shore launch to a 
safe port, but proved unable to fulfill the other, 
essentially cartographical task of the mission. 
The next expedition northward put to sea in 1596, 
captained by Sebastiano Vizcaino, with a first royal order 
to establish a colony with a satisfactory harbor on the Baja 
California coast. Despite the aridity Vizcaino attempted a 
settlement at La Paz--with no success. Respecting the wishes 
of Philip III, who ascended the Spanish throne in 1598, 
Vizcaino returned to northern shores in 1602, outfitted with 
a year's supplies. The flagship San Diego managed to attain 
a latitude of 42 degrees North; a second vessel, the Santo 
Tom~~, foundered at sea; the third ship, the Tres Reyes, 
reconnoitered the coast at lower levels, and rendezvoused 
with the San Diego in 1603 at the port of Acapulco. This 
24 This curious enterprise found Viceroy Velasco 
reluctant to allocate funds for the expedition from his own 
budget, although he fully supported it. Cermenho, meanwhile, 
insisted that sufficient monies be given him in the event 
that the party land in such foreign ports as where money 
might be required. The compromise reached gave Cermenho 
access to the funds of the returning galleon--which wouldn't 
affect Velasco's financial statements--thus he set sail for 
Manila. Wagner, Spanish Voyages, 155-56. 
2~ Of considerable legal and symbolic importance the 
issue of ''taking-possession'' will be discussed in Chapter 
I I I. 
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remained the last planned expedition26 to the northwest 
coast until vessels arrived at Monterey in 1769. 
By this time, Spanish officials were apparently 
convinced that discovery of the strait--and it would be 
considerably to the north the numerous voyages had 
demonstrated--could only lead to its exploitation by 
interlopers. Such an event, colonial officials believed, 
would directly threaten the security of New Spain's northern 
frontier, as well as its productive silver mines. Of course, 
while this argument obviously overlooks the fact that the 
passage might be discovered from the east which would 
presumably lead to the same unfortunate result for Spain, 
the literature is silent. Henry Raup Wagner notes nothing 
more than such exploration in the east ''always elicited the 
interest of the Council of the Indies.'' Additionally, fever 
for the im~gined northern wealth for the most part had 
subsided. The ''timber, grain, fruits, petroleum, and the 
multitudinous products which now bring wealth to this region 
were valueless or would have been had they been 
26 It is necessary to qualify this statement Ci.e., use 
of the word ''planned'') because archaeological evidence has 
revealed that a vessel went down off the Oregon coast at 
about 45 degrees North latitude early in the eighteenth 
century. The wreck littered beaches with beeswax which 
subsequently served as a trade item for the native Americans 
living nearby. ''The best educated guess'' indentifies the 
ship as the 1707 Manila Galleon, San Francisco Xavier. See 
Donald C. Cutter, ''Spain and the Oregon Coast,'' The 
Hestern Shore, ed. Thomas Vaughan (Portland: Oregon 
Historical Society, 1976) 37-38. See also Cook, 31-35. 
14 
produced.' ' 27 Ai1d the rugged cc•astline itself often 
presented an uninviting visage. 
Clearly, a flexible myriad of forces predicated Spain's 
early north coast thrust, including a desire to Christianize 
and an ephemeral urge to settle, a lust for riches and 
adventure, and a concern both to find and to protect from 
alien penetration the Strait of Anian. Yet a full 
understanding of the expeditions necessarily depends on 
placing them into a socio-cultural context. While a 
representative picture of the whole of colonial Mexico is 
not required, it is instructive to delineate certain salient 
elements of the society from which the early voyages were 
launched. 
COLONIAL SOCIETY IN NEW SPAIN 
The fundamental social, cultural, and economic premise 
of Spain's effort in Mexico served to make the colony as 
much like the Mother Country as possible. Careful grooming 
would guarantee, among other things, perpetual dependence. 
This occurred both as a conscious administrative effort, and 
at a more subtle level, as the new settlers were, after all, 
products of a certain environment. In short, New Spain's 
raison d'etre dictated service to the same twin towers--God 
and Potentate--as its parent. 20 
27 ~~agner, Spanish Voyage.;:.·, 284-85. 
28 Timothy E. Anna, ~~spain and the Breakdown of the 
Imperial Ethos: The Problem of Equality,'' Hispanic RIDerican 
Historical Review 62 (1982): 254-72. See also Ha.ring's 
15 
New Spain's administrative structure cast a mirror 
image of the strict hierarchy of the mother country. Atop 
the colonial peak sat the viceroy as sat the monarch in 
Spain. 29 All secular authority derived from this fount 
except, of course, that the viceroy answered to the crown. A 
series of lesser officials completed the corporate ladder. 30 
For comparative purposes, the salient feature to note was 
its heretical nature vis-a-vis the North American Lockean 
tradition. 
Yet still above the potentate sat God, whose commander-
in-chief on earth, the Pope, held the monarch morally 
responsible and accountable for his or her actions. The 
yardstick of the juridical canons of the One True Faith, 
Roman Catholicism, measured the ruler's actions. In fine, 
Spain's political system bordered on theocracy. Likewise, in 
New Spain the church expected colonial officials to act with 
unctuous piety. And as the pyramidal shape of colonial 
seminal work, The Spanish Empire, the political discussion 
of which is especially illustrative. For the spiritual 
bridge between Spain and New Spain see Charles Braden's 
Religious Rspects of the Conquest of Mexico. The economic 
relationship is carefully investigated in Lesley Byrd 
Simpson's The Encomienda in NeH Spain (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1930). 
29 It will be recalled that until the late 1520's 
Cortes, in effect, governed the colony, and that the first 
viceroy, Antonio de Mendoza, did not arrive until 1535. 
30 While far beyond the scope of this paper the 
''corporate'' system has been identified as so profound a 
phenomenon that it exists in modified form even today. In 
her study of sixteenth century New Spain, Liss writes, 
corporatism ''was a way of thinking order into diversity ••• a 
theory employed by central authority to facilitate 
control ••. embedded in language and religion.'' Liss, 145. 
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administration mirrored the top-down model of the Old World, 
so too did the New World church mimic its Iberian parent. 
That is, the archbishop (i.e., New Spain's pope) balanced 
the viceroy Ci.e., New Spain's monarch). 
The theocratic nature of colonial society explains the 
missionary impulse that played a part in virtually every 
early voyage northward. Clergy were deemed as necessary to 
such expeditions as bread and fresh water. The most obvious 
example of just how deep this notion lay bedded in the 
Spanish psyche is that the Conquest of the New World could 
be justified only insofar as it successfully spread God's 
word, an order unequivocally spelled out by Pope Alexander 
VI's Papal Bull of 1493. 31 
Spain's economy can best be described as mercantilist, 
a label also applicable to its European rivals. Yet the 
peculiar Spanish variant of this economic theory stressed 
the accumulation of bullion over trade per se. This idea 
''was conditioned by the prevailing belief that gold and 
silver alone constituted wealth,'' according to Professor 
Clarence Haring. ''Each nation,'' he writes, ''must keep 
what it had and get as much as possible from others ••.• 
Mercantilism was essentially a protectionist system.'' 32 As 
a result, the mother country monopolized trade. Thus, as a 
religious imperative fueled the spiritual Conquest and 
played a role in the early push up the western littoral, so 
32 Simpson, Encomienda, 37. 
32 Haring, 2'33. 
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a lust for riches underscored Spain's interest in Mexico and 
beyond. ''We came here to serve God, and also to get rich,'' 
conquistador-historian Bernal Diaz noted. 33 In no small 
measure then, Spain kept Mexico for the profits, and 
likewise abandoned the north coast for its apparent dearth 
•=• f r i c hes . 
The empirically difficult to measure concept of sense 
of adventure as causative agent thrived in New Spain's early 
expansion and exploration. To this extent, the stereotypical 
image of conquistador as indomitable rogue is quite 
accurate. The language used to describe the voyagers--
''e~;plorers, '' ''discc•verers,'' and sc• on--connc•te the 
evidence needed to substantiate the point. Irving Leonard's 
Books of the Brave, for example, convincingly demonstrates 
how sixteenth century Romantic literature both engendered 
and manifested the ubiquitous will to adventure. 34 Gold, 
Glory, and Gospel, says he, were super-charged imperatives 
driven by the written word: 
After 1500 particularly his [the conquistador's] 
imagination was kindled to an almost mystical 
exaltation of adventure and romance by the many 
books which began to pour from the presses. 3~ 
33 Cited in Liss, 20. 
34 Irving A. Leonard, Books of the Brave 
Harvard University Press, 1949), passim. 




Very broadly speaking, official colonial life was 
neither static nor especially active during the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. A time of greater range for 
individual decision making by the viceroy and his 
subordinates marked the former hundred years, while the 
latter period witnessed increasing centralization of 
decision making. This change directly reflects the vagaries 
of the ruling House of Hapsburg, truly a dismal lot. 
Colonial administration, as a result, performed sluggishly 
and inefficiently. For example, if nothing else, the months 
spent at sea for ordinary correspondence to reach Mexico 
(and vice versa) meant important decisions sat in limbo. 
Moreover, the crown concerned itself less with competency 
than with loyalty in its selection of candidates for 
postings in the New World or in the apparatus of government 
in Spain.31e. 
The crown unified in 1478 under Ferdinand of Aragon and 
Isabella of Castille after centuries of struggle between 
competing princedoms. When the queen died in 1504 the whole 
peninsula, save for Portugal, fell under Ferdinand's 
regency. 317 When Ferdinand died in 1516 his grandson, Charles 
36 A.W. Lovett, Early Hapsburg Spain, 1517-1598 <Oxford 
University Press, 1986) 83-97. 
37 Isabella willed that her daughter, Juana, inherit 
the possessions of Castille. The princess, however, proved 
unequal to the task because of mental instability; thus, in 




V, ascended the throne with dominion over Spain, Naples, 
Sicily, and the Spanish holdings in Africa and the Americas. 
Additionally, he inherited title to The Netherlands and to 
lands in Germany from his paternal Hapsburg grandparents, 
Marie of Burgundy, and the Holy Roman Emperor Maximillian. 
Despite grandiose plans38 and considerable energy, 
Charles V governed ineptly. Ascending the throne totally 
ignorant of Spanish, Charles forcefully attempted to re-
direct the monarchy, and ''ruled as a traditional dynast, 
governing as overlord.'' His new subjects immediately viewed 
him with ''suspicion, then open hostility,'' angered at the 
prospect of serving a ''foreign-born and foreign-reared king 
and his non-Spanish, rapacious officials and courtiers.'' 39 
A failed revolt against the king's doctrinaire absolutism in 
1520-21 left Charles--and the House of Hapsburg--firmly 
ensconced as ruler of Spain. When he at length renounced the 
throne in 1556 Spain lay prostrate, bankrupt and heavily in 
debt to German and Italian investors. 
His son, Philip II, proved to be of no greater stature 
than the father. Though the taking of Portugal in 1580 
increased naval strength, war with Britain utterly 
devastated Spain's mighty Armada in 1588. Then, from 
Philip's death in 1598, the picture for Spain only worsened. 
~e Charles sought, for example, to marry off his son to 
Mary Tudor of England, which would have effectively united 
the ruling houses of the world's greatest maritime power, 
Spain, with its heir apparent. Mary's untimely death in 1558 
scuttled the plan. 
:=>'9 Liss, 32. 
The first two of the three seventeenth century Hapsburg 
monarchs--Philip III (1598-1621) and Philip IV (1621-1665)--
managed to lose much of The Netherlands, Flanders, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, and other holdings. Weak and 
incompetent they chose to leave the work of government to 
hand-picked favorites. The rule of Charles II, last of the 
Hapsburg line, proved even more disastrous for the Spanish 
Empire. He has been judged ''the most degenerate, and the 
most pathetic victim of Hapsburg inbreeding ••. mentally 
subnormal •.• no more than a cipher, a shadow king. 40 
As its European rivals inexorably eclipsed Spain, the 
colony advanced slowly, reflecting the character of Hapsburg 
rule. Despite the extraction of great wealth from extremely 
productive silver mines <bullion!) the mother country 
siphoned off virtually all the profits to service its many 
debts. Meanwhile, colonial policy so restricted trade in New 
Spain that only one port, Veracruz, remained open for 
business; and to it could only come goods from the trade 
monopolists at Seville and Cadiz. Moreover, exhaustive 
mercantilist regulation severely hampered colonists' ability 
to establish indigenous industries while, given the nature 
of monopoly, the imported goods commanded unreasonably high 
prices and frequently exhibited poor workmanship. 
Under such conditions it is not surprising that 
smuggling plagued Spanish officials in the Gulf of Mexico, 
40 John Lynch, Spain Under the Hapsburgs (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, l.'36'3) 22'3. 
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despite the fact that it merited punishment by pain of 
death. As the sale of contraband thrived, the Spanish and 
colonial economies suffered because smuggling precluded both 
Spanish profit-making and the collection of potential tax 
revenues. 
Ironically, the Church in New Spain thrived under 
Hapsburg rule, especially during the seventeenth century. 
This institution amassed ever more substantial tracts of 
land--rendered, incidentally, quite unproductive--and 
achieved an hegemonic position, not unlike the Medieval 
Church in Europe: 
.•• the Spanish church in America, managed to 
create a vast material base that ultimately 
reached into every corner of the newly converted 
Indies. Apprehensive of clerical power while at 
the same time convinced that restriction on rights 
to property would spare the church material 
concerns that might interfere with its spiritual 
mission, the crown sporadically opposed, but in 
the end was unwilling to limit, the income of an 
institution that provided the fundamental social 
cohesion in a disparate but pious empire. 41 
The Church acted as the principle money lender in New Spain 
and, as the Inquisition reached its long arm across the 
Atlantic, in a metaphorical sense the One True Faith 
provided banking services both temporally and spiritually. 
As the eighteenth century beckoned New Spain had in a 
very real sense been isolated from international trends and 
41 Arnold J. Bauer. ''The Church in the Economy of 
Spanish America: Censos and Depositas in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries,'' Hispanic Rmerican Historical Review 
63 C1983): 707. See also Irving A. Leonard, Baroque Times in 
Old Mexico CAnn Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959) 
221. 
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developments. Although the mother country sought the 
greatest possible return on its investment, from bad 
government in Iberia came ineffectual administration vis-a-
vis exploitation of the colony. Administrative inertia 
smothered all the elements promoting exploration discussed 
earlier. The Conquistadores had been supplanted, on the one 
hand, by settlers, and on the other hand by lack of success 
i.e., they found neither bullion nor healthy adventure on 
the Northwest coast. Additionally, in keeping with colonial 
policy, Spanish officials who had little interest in 
continuing such voyages usurped the power of these 
individuals, as for example, when Viceroy Mendoza supplanted 
Cortes in 1535. Even the Roman Catholic Church contented 
itself with modest advances into the northern frontier. When 
Charles II, ''El Hechizado,'' the bewitched, died heirless 
in 1700 a decade-long struggle ensued for control of the 
Spanish throne and a new age dawned. 
THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 
Although the great powers of Europe grappled in the War 
of the Spanish Succession for the right to determine who 
would replace Charles II as Spain's monarch, for the 
purposes of this study it need not be afforded much detail. 
Certain salient elements are important, however, because the 
new royal family returned Spain to near greatness, and re-
established the Spanish presence on the Northwest coast. 
23 
Two would-be Spanish kings vied for position as death 
hovered about the bed of Charles II: Archduke Charles of 
Austria, younger son of the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold; and 
Felipe of Anjou, grandson to Louis XIV of France. Charles, 
in one of his more cogent moments willed his throne to the 
capable Felipe, a decision duplicated by Louis XIV. England, 
startled by the prospect of facing a united front of France 
and Spain that this succession would engender, went to war 
to prevent it, and received support from Austria, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, and some small German states. The 
fighting began in 1702, continued until 1713, and officially 
ended with the Treaty of Utrecht. 4 2 
While the House of Bourbon garnered the Spanish throne, 
Britain gained major trade concessions in the Spanish Indies 
(known as the Asiento), a guarantee that the royal houses of 
Spain and France would not unite under Felipe and, 
additionally, England gained the strategic outpost of 
Gibraltar. Moreover, another treaty concluded the following 
year gave away what possessions Spain still held in The 
Netherlands, while Austria received lands in Italy. Yet 
remarkably, the Spanish House of Bourbon would rally to 
overcome these and other formidable obstacles. 
42 Anthony H. Hull, Charles III and the Revival of 
Spain CWashington: University Press of America, 1981) 1-2. 
24 
CHAPTER II 
RETURN TO THE NORTHWEST COAST 
The first three expeditions to the northwest coast in 
the eighteenth century sailed during the reign of the 
Bourbon monarch Carlos III (1759-1788), who has been 
considered one of Spain's most illustrious monarchs. Under 
the aegis of the so-called Bourbon Reforms, his far-sighted 
policies returned Spain to near greatness through continued 
centralization of government, improved efficiency, and 
bolstered defenses. In New Spain the successful 
implementation of royal policies and desires required 
especial competency in two key positions. First, the 
accomplishments of Visitador Jose de Galvez represent the 
manifestation of the Enlightened philosophies guiding 
Carlos's thinking; and, second, the viceregal administration 
of Antonio Bucareli illustrates the critical performance 
expected of a viceroy. 
Galvez's service to the crown punctuated Carlos's 
reign, initially as visitor-general to Mexico (1765-1771), 
and later as Minister to the Council of the Indies (1776-
1787), the Spanish body responsible for colonial 
administration.~ Galvez's unyielding desire to ensure that 
~ Since its inception in 1524 the Council of the Indies 
had directed the Crown's affairs in the Americas. It reached 
the nadir of its power in the sixteenth century, after which 
the crown's policies be adherred to, as well as his own 
recommendations for improvements, necessitated that he be 
involved with planning the expeditions to the northwest 
coast. 
Incorporated into the consequent roles of Galvez and 
most intimately tied to the exploration is the period 1771 
through 1779 during which Antonio Bucareli served as viceroy 
of Mexico, and during which the voyages were launched. 
Eulogized as an exemplary viceroy, Bucareli in fact planned 
and directed the expeditions. 
The raison d'etre of the voyages of the 1770's can best 
be understood by first examining salient elements of the 
reigns of the eighteenth century Bourbon monarchs. The 
achievevments of Galvez, Bucareli, and the importance of 
several influential apocryphal voyages likewise serve to 
illustrate the causal agents that engendered the Perez 
(1774), Hezeta-Bodega (1775), and Arteaga-Bodega C1779) 
e~;pedi tic•ns. 
BOURBON KINGS 
When Felipe V (1700-1746) assumed the throne in 1713 
following the War of the Spanish Succession he inherited a 
nation in shambles. The economy, always sluggish and 
inefficient in wholly lethargic Hapsburg hands, had been 
devastated by the demands made on it by the conflict. Trade 
its influence declined steadily, if slowly. See Mark A. 
Burkholder, ~~The Council of the Indies in the late 
Eighteenth Century: A New Perspective,'' Hispanic ~merican 
Historical Review 56 C1973): 404-05. 
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with the colonies earlier fell short of its potential 
because of the restrictive monopoly systems but, as a result 
of the war, Spain lost a substantial share of its economic 
sovereignty due to trade concessions and debts incurred to 
fund the conflict. Further, Spanish military preparedness 
had declined precipitously, until it was represented at sea-
-the nation that had launched the mighty Armada of 1588--by 
a puny naval force of 20 warships. Equally telling, the 
spirit of the infantry had been so broken and the incentive 
to fight had become so negligible from endemic Spanish 
losses that troops often ran away from battle. 
Undaunted and with vigor, Felipe took up the challenge 
to rebuild the Iberian nation. He ruled over a truly 
Spanish--and consequently more manageable--empire, 
consisting of the kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, plus 
possessions in the New World. His first reform measure 
sought to reduce interlopers' penetration of the colonial 
economies. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) had exacerbated the 
smuggling problem by the Rsiento giving Britain a foothold 
in Spain's New World slave trade, and the right to send one 
annual shipload of merchandise to the colony. Smugglers 
capitalized on both concessions, using the sanctioned trade 
network as a thinly guised conduit for contraband. Spain 
responded by commissioning privateers to patrol New Spain's 
Atlantic coastline in search of illegal vessels, which led 
to war with Britain in 1739. Related to his first Bourbon 
reform policy, Felipe's second policy attempted to revive 
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the torpidly slow flota system, an easy and oft targeted 
spoil for interlopers. But by engaging British nationals in 
combat the Spanish privateers further roused the island 
nation, and in 1740 Spain temporarily suspended the flota 
system after losing the war. 
The ultimate solution addressed the problems in two 
ways. On the one hand, Spain replaced the ponderously slow 
and difficult to defend galleons with newer, lighter, and 
much quicker vessels which typically sailed singly. And on 
the other hand, when danger appeared to be minimal the crown 
simply re-established the f lota system. 
Felipe made no attempt to re-structure colonial 
administration, but rather sought to improve it through a 
process stressing increased centralization, and by improving 
the quality of offi~ials. The Crown, for example, largely 
eliminated the sale of offices to the highest bidder without 
regard to qualification. 2 Other administrative improvements 
included moving the official port from Seville to Cadiz, 3 a 
better, more efficient harbor, and doubling to two the 
~ Despite opposition from the Council of the Indies, 
Bourbon monarchs, always in need of revenue, never 
completely abandoned the Hapsburg practise of the widespread 
sale of powerful and prestigious offices. See Mark 
Burkholder, and D.S. Chandler, ''Creole Appointments and the 
Sale of Audencia Positions in the Spanish Empire under the 
Early Bourbons, 1701-1750.'' Journal of Latin Rmerican 
Studies 3-4 (1971-72): 187-206. 
3 Seville's proximity to Spanish agricultural lands, 
which stocked vessels sailing to the New World, had 
traditionally disadvantageJ the superior harbor site of 
Cadiz. Lovett, 84. 
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annual number of ships allowed to trade between Manila and 
Acapulco. 
This first Spanish Bourbon monarch stumbled badly in 
international affairs, frequently involving Spain in armed 
conflicts, especially with Britain; and, with similar 
frequency, losing. Galvez's biographer, Professor Herbert I. 
Priestley, attributes Felipe's diplomatic troubles to three 
things: Felipe's blind desire to regain title to the French 
throne; a desire to re-gain Minorca and Gibraltar; and, the 
desire of his wife, Isabel Farnese, 4 to establish her sons 
in Italy.e 
On Felipe's death in 1746, Fernando VI, the second but 
only surviving son of his first marriage came to the throne 
at the age of 33. Less aggressive than his father, 
Fernando's only substantive achievement seems to have been 
to continue the former's policies, with the notable 
exception of keeping Spain out of costly wars. Thus, the 
Iberian nation would ''enjoy fourteen years of much-needed 
peace, during which the improvements introduced by Felipe 
(i.e., further centralization of power and increasing 
mercantile efficiency) took firm root,'' 6 but during 
4 Isabel's considerable influence on the king has been 
attributed to Felipe's insatiable sexual appetite. The 
res•.tlt: ''Philip was at the same time the tyrant and the 
slave of the woman he loved.'' Charles Petrie, King Charles 
Ill of Spain, An Enlightened Despot (London: Constable and 
Co. , 1 971 ) 3. 
e Herbert I. Priestley, Jose de Galvez, Visitor-General 
of New Spain <1765-1771> <Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1916) 14-15. 
Ferdinand's tenure colonial policy and administration 
changed little. 
The reign of Fernando's half-brother, Carlos III, who 
ruled from 1759 till his death in 1789, achieved an opposite 
effect and returned Spain to near greatness. A series of 
far-sighted policies revived the imperial economy, both at 
home and in the colony, and defenses were bolstered on every 
shore. While one must not exaggerate Carlos's successes--the 
essence of mercantilism survived, and Spain was inexorably 
eclipsed by European rivals--for a brief time his policies 
narrowed the ever widening gap. 7 For a significant part of 
Carlos's reign one key figure, Jose de Galvez, served the 
Crown both in New Spain as visitor-general (1765-1771), and 
in Spain as Minister of the Indies (1776-1787). 
VISITOR-GENERAL JOSE DE GALVEZ 
The visitador's functions and responsibilities were 
clear, according to Haring: 
Visitas were of two sorts, which may be called 
specific and general. The former applied to a 
single official or province; the general visita 
was an inspection or investigation of an entire 
viceroyalty or captaincy general. Everything came 
within the purview of the visitador-general, from 
the conduct of viceroys, bishops and judges to 
that of the local parish priest; although when a 
6 Bernard E. Bobb, The Vicere9ency of Antonio Maria de 
Bucareli in New Spain~ 1771-1779 <Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1962) 13. 
7 In a well researched study, Jose Cuello traces 
Bourbon reform measures in a localized setting. ''The 
Economic Impact of the Bourbon Reforms and the Late Colonial 
Crisis of Empire at the Local Level.'' The Americas 44 
(1987-88): 301-23. 
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viceroy was included in a visita it was only in 
his capacity as president of the audencia [the 
chief administrative body in the colonyJ •••• e 
Galvez's visita was of the general type, and he is 
universally hailed as a visitador without equal. Rising from 
the lowly station of shepherd boy, he served energetically 
and usually successfully, even though suffering a bout of 
madness in 1769. 9 
Trained as a lawyer, and appointed visitor-general 
February 20, 1765, his orders from the king, in part, read: 
.•• you may, in the capacity of visitor-general of 
all the branches, revenues, and duties, which in 
any form appertain to my real hacienda [public 
financeJ within the jurisdiction of the kingdom of 
New Spain, take cognizance of all of them, examine 
their proceeds, expenses, balances, and the 
whereabouts of their funds; demand any arrears in 
which the administrators, treasurers, lessees of 
revenues, or other persons who have managed rents, 
may be to my real hacienda; and regulate the 
system and management with which the revenues are 
to be administered in future, reducing expenses 
and salaries which can and ought to be lowered or 
abolished, so that the balances be not dissipated 
by unnecessary expense, but made more effective to 
their destined ends. 10 
e Haring dates the first visita to 1499, an 
investigation of the government of Christopher Colombus. 
Intent on unseating Viceroy Mendoza, Cortes in 1540 
apparently persuaded the Council of the Indies to employ a 
visita to investigate his arch-rival, but it came to little 
effect. Haring, 142-43. 
9 The pious and proper visitador became irrational 
during his tour of the northern provinces in 1769-70. 
Apparently, so powerfully did the fears of Russian 
encroachments play upon his mind that he suffered wild 
delusions, imagining himself, variously, to be the king of 
Prussia, Sweden, the pope, and St. Francis of Assisi. Within 
months he recovered completely. See Cook, 53-54. 
ao For a translation of the full text of the royal 
instruction Jose de Galvez received, see Priestley, 404-12. 
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Galvez arrived in New Spain on the heels of Carlos's 
many orders designed to revitalize the Imperial and colonial 
economies. The sequence is important, because although the 
Crown hoped to invigorate the colonial economy, the 
underlying premise always concerned the welfare of the 
mother country. His initial plans centered on establishing a 
government tobacco monopoly from which Spain might re-coup 
financial losses it suffered in the Seven Year's War (1756-
1763), in which Spain lost Florida and almost lost Cuba; 
rooting out corruption, for example, by reforming the 
customs house at Veracruz; and, most importantly, bolstering 
defenses on the northern frontier. 
Galvez established the tobacco monopoly almost 
immediately after his arrival, during the viceregency of the 
Marques de Cruillas. An early failure, the corporation 
thrived after 1766 when Carlos Francisco de Croix replaced 
Cruillas, whom Galvez did not like. 11 The collection of 
customs duties had been the prerogative of certain 
contracted parties since the 1500's but Galvez returned the 
service to colonial administrators as contracts expired. 
Moreover, the Council of the Indies adopted his 
recommendations and opened additional, competitive ports at 
Campeche and Yucatan. 12 
11 See Priestley, Chapter IV, ,,Galvez and Cruillas--
The Tobacco Monopoly,'' 135-71. 
12 Priestley, 202. 
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Frontier fortification is best seen in the light of 
expulsion of the Jesuits from all Spanish dominions in 1767. 
Carlos III issued the order in part because the Society of 
Jesus represented the most obvious challenge (with 
significant symbolic overtones) to the ''Enlightened 
Despotism'' of the Bourbons. In Lesley Byrd Simpson's words, 
''The Jesuits had become too powerful for their own 
good.'' 13 Additionally, certain powerful, anti-clerical 
officials convinced the king the order planned to depose or 
kill him. 14 Yet the push northward either by sea or by land 
always stemmed at least in part from proselytizing 
imperatives, and so an effective defense of the frontier 
meant essentially to defend the manifestation of the very 
institution (the Church) whose prerogatives the Crown sought 
otherwise to subordinate to its own, more secular interests! 
Galvez began a first inspection tour of the frontier 
provinces in April of 1767. The situation at the presidia of 
El Paso in 1765 typified the dangerous and frequently 
chaotic conditions. Guarded by fifty men, over whom a 
captain wielded supreme military and civil authority, 1 ~ the 
13 Lesley Byrd Simpson, Many Mexicos (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1941) 200. 
14 Engstrand, 440. 
1 ~ A number of specific actions dealt with the northern 
frontier problems. Most importantly, Galvez capitalized on 
the opportunity Julian de Arriaga's death left him in 1776, 
replacing him as Minister of the Indies and initiating a 
proposal that re-structured New Spain administratively by 
establishing a whole new sub-viceroy. Under the plan several 
northern province were removed from the jurisdiction of the 
viceregent and placed under the command of a captain-
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overriding concern involved defense against hostile Indians, 
whose lands they had invaded. In his diary the outpost's 
commander, Jose de la Fuente, appeared to be totally 
preoccupied with ''the enemy Indians.'' During the month of 
September he recorded: 
On the twentieth the Apache Indians stole twenty-
one head of cattle belonging to don Alonzo de la 
Cadena, a citizen of Chihuahua. Of these they made 
off with nine, while the other twelve were taken 
away from them by five Indians of the village of 
Senecu [about five miles southeast of Ciudad 
Juarez] who were out hunting. Two of the animals 
died of wounds received by the Apaches. 16 
During September and October of that year Fuente reported a 
net loss of 18 oxen, 21 cattle, and an undisclosed number of 
mules to Indian thievery. The Spanish retribution netted six 
dead Indians, and seventeen taken prisoner. 17 
Just two days out of Guadalajara Galvez received a 
communique from Spain's Secretary of State, the Marques de 
Grimaldi, via Viceroy de Croix, instructing him to take 
immediate action to counteract recent Russian encroachments 
toward California. Galvez interrupted the northward 
general, who represented the Crown directly, and acted both 
as supreme civil and military authority. The premise was 
simple: to relieve the viceroy from nagging problems on the 
frontier that might be better addressed by a military man. 
Bucareli's strong opposition delayed its implementation 
until 1776. See Charles Edward Chapman, Chapter XXV, ''The 
Commandancy-General of the Frontier Provinces,'' R History 
of California: The Spanish Period <New York: Octagon Books, 
1928) 316-29. 
16 Jose de la Fuente, ''Diary of Pedro Jose de la 
Fuente, Captain of the Presidio of El Paso del Norte, 
August-December, 1765,'' trans. James M. Daniel, 
Southwestern Historical Quarterly 83 C1979-80l 259-78. 
17 Fuente, passim. 
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expedition and months later, in 1768, a junta composed of 
Galvez, de Croix, the archbishop, the judges of the two 
audencias (headquartered in Guadalajara, and Mexico City, 
respectively) and other important officials, met to address 
the royal concerns. Priestley cites eight problems the junta 
sought to redress, including such things as counter-
productively high export duties, agricultural stagnation due 
to a lack of black slaves, and lax enforcement of 
regulations. 19 More to our point, however, the junta very 
directly expressed concerns with putative Russian 
encroachments on New Spain's Pacific frontier, and in a 
joint despatch issued to the Council of the Indies noted: 
It is known to our court by the voyages and 
narratives that have been published in Europe that 
the Russians have familiarized themselves with the 
navigation of the sea of Tartary, and that 
(according to a well-founded report) they already 
carry on trade in furs with a continent, or 
perhaps an island ([AlaskaJl, distant only eight 
hundred leagues from the Western Coast of the 
Californias •••• 
Additionally, it continued: 
•.• that from the year 1749 •.•. the English and 
Dutch have acquired a very particular knowledge of 
the ports and bays we hold on the South coast, 
especially the peninsula of the Californias; so 
that it would be neither impossible, nor indeed 
very difficult, for one of these nations, or the 
Muscovites, to establish, when least expected, a 
colony in the port of Monterey. 19 
Officials in Spain were cognizant of the Russian 
danger, having been warned as early as 1761 by the Duke of 
19 Most of the issues were of purely administrative 
focus. Priestley, 26-31. 
1 ~ Cited in Richman, 65. 
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Almodovar, Spain's representative in St. Petersburg, that 
Russian fur-traders had been moving ever nearer Spanish 
dominions. However, Galvez and de Croix's remonstrations 
further highlighted the need fc•r action, and prompted the 
establishment of the Naval Department at San Blas in 1767 
and the mission at Monterey in 1769. 20 
THE NAVAL STATION AT SAN BLAS 
Russian north-Pacific exploration and exploitation had 
been well known for some years, and served to re-activate 
Spain's sixteenth century fears of foreign meddling on its 
colonies' western littoral. To that end, the naval station 
constructed at San Blas in 1767-68, and the settlements 
established at San Diego and Monterey in 1769 constituted 
Galvez's response to the Spanish Secretary of State Marques 
de Grimaldi, Minister of the Indies Julian de Arriaga, and 
the expressed fears of the junta. 
Clearly, any expedition sailing north to Alta 
California (and beyond) needed a suitable launching port, 
yet it is somewhat surprising Galvez favored San Blas. 
Drifting silt deposits frequently rendered the shallow 
harbor all but unnavigable and, built on a malarial swamp, 
the climate could be deadly. In short, as Galvez's 
secretary, Juan Manuel Viniegra, recorded, San Blas ''is 
almost uninhabitable as a consequence of its scorching 
20 See Chapter V, ''Reoccupation of Monterey, and 
Discovery of the Bay Of San Francisco,'' Richman, 62-89. 
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climate and the host of poisonous insects littering its 
soi1.rr21 
On the other hand, well-sheltered and considerably 
north of the port of Acapulco, San Blas strategically 
provided a shorter, more direct route to northern waters. 
This factor assumed considerable importance when even from 
San Blas a voyage to the cape of Baja California in a 
schooner might consume as many as twenty days; in a smaller 
packet-boat nearly three months might be required. 22 
Conveniently situated only a short distance from the supply 
and provincial capital of Guadalajara, naval department 
personnel might be quartered at nearby Tepic, a community in 
the mountains Alexander von Humboldt later described as 
''salubrious''. 23 Finally, a good, local supply of ship-
building timber tipped the balance in San Blas's favor. 24 
21 Cited in Thomas Vaughan, ''Russian , French, British 
and American Incursions into 'The Spanish Lake','' To the 
Totem Shore: The Spanish Presence on the Northwest Coast, 
Santiago Saavedra, gen. ed. (Madrid: Ministerio de Turismo y 
Transporte, 1986): 41. 
22 Michael E. Thurman, The Naval Department at San 
Blas, New Spain's Bastion for Rlta California and Nootka, 
1767 to 1798 (Glendale, Ca.: The Arthur H. Clarke Co., 1967) 
59. By comparison, a modern crossing by government ferry 
from Puerto Vallarta to La Paz requires only about 24 hours. 
23 Alexander von Humboldt, Political Essay on the 
Kingdom of New Spain, trans. John Black, vol. 2 (New York: 
I. Riley, 1811) 149-50. 
24 Thurman, passim. For a first-hand account recorded 
in the early nineteenth century, see Humboldt, passim. 
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NORTH TO MONTEREY 
Spanish fear of the Russians grew almost exponentially 
with each new revelation that the Euro-Asians edged ever 
closer to California. The Russians saw the area as part of 
their expanding Pacific empire, whereas the Spanish viewed 
the north coast as nothing more than an extension of 
California. 2 e But what resistance had any Russian fur-trader 
ever encountered from the Spanish who alleged to ''own'' it? 
The answer is, none. 
Out of curiosity not unlike Spain's early search for 
the Strait of Anian Russian explorers sought to discover the 
geographical relationship between their empire and America. 
The Cossack Semen Dezhnev, for example, first espied the 
Bering Sea Cthe true Northwest Passage) in 1648 when he led 
a party of ninety men along the Russian coast until it met 
open sea. Dezhnev unfortunately shared a common fate with 
the Spanish mariner Ulloa, because the information was 
neither utilized nor long remembered, and credit for the 
discovery ultimately went to another, Vitus Bering, a Dane 
in the employ of the Tsar. 
After 1700 Peter the Great renewed Russian interest in 
Pacific exploration. Several impetuses lured fur-traders 
north and east toward North America: to emulate other 
empires meant to explore and to exploit; to seek greater 
scientific knowledge; to accommodate the demands of ''the 
2~ Van Alstyne, 187. See also Hubert Howe Bancroft, 
History of ~laska, 1730-1885 <San Francisco, 1886) 194-95. 
38 
youthful enthusiasm and dreams of the new Russian navy''; 
and, to augment a dwindling supply of valuable pelts. 26 
Among the notable Russian explorers who stand out among the 
many who visited the north-eastern shores of the ''Spanish 
Lake'' are Bering, and Aleksei I. Chirikov. Although 
commercially profitless, Bering quite unwittingly led the 
cartographically successful First Kamchatka Expedition of 
1725-1731 into the strait that now bears his name. He also 
led the Second Kamchatka Expedition of 1733-1742 but died 
after his ship wrecked on Bering Island. His second, 
Chirikov, managed to salvage the vestiges of the scurvy-
wracked expedition, and completed the voyage--again to 
considerable cartographical effect. 27 
As their efforts clearly paid well in furs, Russian 
excursions to Alaskan shores became more frequent, and 
established the initial alien presence in the northeast 
Pacific that so frightened the Spaniards. The Spanish at 
length responded by settling Alta California. The effort 
began with a four-pronged thrust in 1768-69, with two 
parties sailing and two marching overland. 9 
26 Vaughan, ''The Spanish Lake,'' -.C' ..::.~ .. 
27 Vaughan, ''The Spanish Lake,'' 26-28. See also 
Chapters IV and V, ''Discovery of Alaska,'' and ''Death of 
Bering,'' in Bancroft's ~laska, 35-62, and 63-74, 
respectively. 
n See Chapter XVII, ''The Spanish Occupation of Alta 
California,'' in Chapman's Spanish Period, 216-231. 
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BEYOND CALIFORNIA 
Despite Spain's efforts in California reports of 
Russian meddling in more northerly waters continued to 
circulate and startle the Spanish. By 1773 it had become 
clear that Spain would adopt additional measures in the 
''Lake'' before being satisfied that its claims had been 
secured. Viceroy Antonio de Bucareli, who arrived in New 
Spain in 1771 after serving six years as governor of Cuba, 
received orders in 1773 to take further action to circumvent 
Russian meddling in the northern climes. 
Indeed, by 1773 and the warnings issued by Spain's new 
ambassador to Russia, the Conde de Lacy, expeditions led by 
Bering's heirs had penetrated the Pacific Northwest littoral 
southward to 64 degrees North latitude. Further, the count 
speculated that Russians might invade California, 29 and, to 
that end, Minister of the Indies Arriaga directed Bucareli 
immediately to take steps to preclude such an event. 
APOCRYPHAL VOYAGES 
A final factor drawing the Spanish northward again 
after almost two hundred years of neglect were tales of 
imaginary voyages said to have discovered the Strait of 
Anian late in the sixteenth century. The first of three 
29 Mercedes Palau, ''The Spanish Presence on the 
Northwest Coast Sea-going Expeditions (1774-1793),'' To the 
Totem Shore: The Spanish Presence on the NorthHest Coast, 
Santiago Saavedra, gen. ed., (Madrid: Ministerio de Turismo 
y Transporte, 1986): 43. 
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significant stories is that of Lorenzo Ferrer Maldonado, 
published in 1609. He claimed to have traversed the strait 
in 1588 on a course which evokes a striking resemblance to 
the actual passage. Toward the end of his testimony 
Maldonado recorded: 
To some persons it has seemed impossible to 
navigate at so high an altitude of the pole;--in 
answer it may be observed that the Hanseatics live 
in latitude 72 degrees ••• Having cleared the Strait 
of Labrador we begin to descend from that 
latitude, steering W.S.W. and S.W. for three 
hundred and fifty leagues, till we arrived in 
latitude 71 degrees, when we perceived a high 
coast without being able to discover whether it 
was a part of the continent or an island, but we 
remarked that if it was the continent it must be 
opposite to the coast of New Spain. 30 
Maldonado's well earned reputation as an informed member of 
the nautical fraternity buttressed his claim. 31 
The second, and certainly more infamous apocryphal 
voyage sailed under the command of Juan de Fuca, alleged 
discoverer of the straits that now bear his name. Although 
not officially published until 1626 the Fuca tale may have 
influenced the voyages of Cermenho in 1594 and Vizcaino in 
1596 and 1602, as noted in Chapter I. Raised by Professor 
Warren Cook, this interesting case considers several 
factors. 
First, in building a plausible argument for Fuca's tale 
Cook argues that if Fuca (actually a Greek baptized 
30 Lorrenzo Ferrer Maldonado, Appendix No. II, R 
Chronological History of Voyages into the Arctic Regions, 
by John Barrow, 1873 CNew York: Barnes and Noble, 1971) 28. 
31 Cook, 21. 
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Apostolos Valerianos) in fact had convinced Spanish 
authorities that he had found the passageway, both Cermenho 
and Vizcaino would surely have been privy to the information 
by virtue of their positions in New Spain. If authorities 
believed Fuca's tale to be true then it helps explain the 
flurry of activity on the coast in the period 1592-1602. 
Moreover, a~ noted, Spain decided to forego further 
explorations in part because of the fear that interlopers 
would exploit the passage. This makes more sense, obviously, 
if colonial officials held the existence of the passageway 
to be a demonstrated fact. 32 Nonetheless, Cook is ultimately 
non-committal. He writes: 
While it is probable that Fuca was an experienced 
pilot in Pacific waters, there is no corroboration 
that he led an expedition to a high altitude in 
1592. Yet the absence of confirmation of such a 
voyage does not remove it from the realm of the 
possible •..• The archives of Spain and Spanish 
America are far from plumbed and may yet provide 
evidence to prove or disprove Fuca's claim. 33 
Wagner, however, from whom Cook borrows heavily, gives the 
veracity of Fu ca' s claim nr:• credence, charging, ''there is 
no probability whatever that Fuca or anyone else had 
discovered this strait.'' 34 
Unquestionably, however, the published claim played a 
role in launching the expeditions of the 1770's. Michael 
22 Cook, 25-27. 
33 Cook, :::9 
34 Henry R. Wagner, introduction, ''Fray Benito de la 
Sierra's Account of the Hezeta Expedition to the Northwest 
Coast in 1775,'' trans by A.J. Baker, California Historical 
Society ~aarterly 9 C1930): 208. 
4 --:· ~ 
Lok, financial backer of Martin Frobisher's voyages in 1576, 
1577, and 1578, met Fuca in Venice in 1596, and from him 
recorded a remarkable tale: 
••• a broad Inlet of Sea, between 47. and 48. 
degrees of Latitude: hee entred thereinto, sayling 
therein more than twentie dayes, and found that 
land tending still North-west and North-east, and 
North, and also east and South-eastward, and very 
much broader Sea than was at the said 
entrance ••• 3 e 
Wagner gives considerable weight to the influence of 
the third alleged voyage through the Northwest Passage, 
captained by Bartholomew de Fonte in 1640. Published without 
fanfare in London in 1708 this tale, in conjunction with the 
Maldonado and Fuca legends, helped persuade the British 
House of Commons in 1744 to post a 20,000 pound reward for 
anyone who could verifiably re-find the passageway. 36 Not 
43 
surprisingly, this act did not go unnoticed in Spain, 
although several decades would pass before the Iberian 
nation would be moved to action. 
It may be observed that the various influences 
prompting the 1770's expeditions essentially mirrored the 
impetuses behind the voyages of the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries. Obvic•usl y, h•:•wever, their respective 
weights had changed. While it may be held as axiomatic that 
always a lust for riches and adventure fueled the actual 
voyagers, this proved to be less true for colonial officials 
3~ Cook, 540. A full transcription of Michael Lok's 
Fuca tale is presented in Cook, 539-43. 
36 Cook, 30. 
in the late eighteenth century than it had been in the 
sixteenth century. 
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The Crown sought first to protect territory it 
considered to be unequivocally Spanish, and that 
specifically entailed defense against encroachments by 
Russians, Britons, interlopers, or any potentially 
disruptive agent(s). As a corollary to this a desire to find 
the Strait of Anian re-surfaced. As it had been demonstrated 
to official Spanish satisfaction in the sixteenth century 
that no easily accessible source of wealth could be gained 
from the north coast and hence no compelling economic motive 
to continue searching the coast existed, it was equally true 
that Spain's New World Pacific shores were vulnerable if 
such a passage could be found. As a result, Spain felt that 
no discovery better served its interests than a well 
publicized discovery; but, conversely, if locating the 
passage was inevitable then Spain logically wanted to arrive 
first. 37 Similarly, alleged voyages of the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries and an intense British 
desire to find the Strait of Anian also served to spark the 
new Spanish interest in Pacific Northwest exploration and 
exploitation. 
3 7 Wagner, ''Sierra's Account,'' 202. 
CHAPTER III 
UNDER BUCARELI'S DIRECTION 
Placed in an eighteenth century context, the re-
emergence of the various sixteenth century impetuses behind 
the Spanish voyages to the northwest coast led to the 
deployment of new expeditions in the 1770's. Spanish fears, 
especially of Russian encroachments into the Pacific 
Northwest, festered early in the decade, forcing Spain to 
react. Viceroy Bucareli surveyed and directed plans to 
thwart the perceived foreign threats, and to establish a 
definitive, legally tenable Spanish claim to the littoral. 
Antonio Maria Bucareli y Ursua, the 46th viceroy of New 
Spain, arrived at the port of Veracruz August 23, 1771, 
ready to take up his new duties. Although his transfer from 
Cuba disappointed the deeply conservative viceroy, 
Bucareli's character was such that he embraced duty as a 
passion. 1 His energies, as a result, ensured a cordial 
relationship with the hard-working visitador, Jose de 
Galvez, who stayed on several months after Bucareli's 
arrival to familiarize the new viceroy with the workings of 
1 Bucareli wanted to return to Spain in 1770. ''Five 
years is as much as a man can serve well in America,'' he 
wrote to a friend. Cited in Bobb, 20. 
colonial administration and the efforts he had made to 
improve them. 
Bucareli's biographer, Bernard Bobb, attributes the 
viceroy's initial hesitancy in office to a typically 
cautious attitude magnified by unfamiliar surroundings. 2 As 
with his predecessor Carlos Francisco de Croix, the new 
viceroy faced hostile Indians on the northern frontier, a 
meager budget with which to administer the colony, and 
pressures to increase revenues for the mother country. 
Still, many authors have heralded his successes. He balanced 
an endemically unbalanced budget, 3 and oversaw some of New 
Spain's most productive years as the world's largest 
producer of silver. 4 
Bucareli obtained full awareness of earlier warnings 
about Russian designs on the northwest coast, possibly on 
California. Until 1773, however, no action he took impacted 
on the new California settlements or arose from the 
knowledge that Russians might attempt to overrun the 
outposts. Several views attempt to explain the viceroy's 
apparent inertia. Noted scholar Charles Edward Chapman 
2 Bc•bb, 131. 
3 Bobb singles out Bucareli's financial wizardry as his 
greatest achievement. However, he stresses that no 
fundamental reorganization or re-structuring of the colony 
occurred during Bucareli's tenure; rather, in good Bourbon 
fashion the viceroy simply tightened lax adherence to 
regulation. Bobb also insists Galvez should share in this 
glory. See Bobb, 209-11. 
4 See Bobb's chapter, ''The Mexican Mining Industry,'' 
172-204. 
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writing in the 1920's calls Bucareli ''the greatest hero who 
has ever appeared in the field of California history,'' and 
argued that the viceroy simply needed a settling-in period 
at his new post before his greatness could blossom.e But one 
must be cautious with Chapman's opinions, for he later 
marshalls evidence of a very questionable nature. For 
example, to complement his glowing admiration of Bucareli, 
he writes: ''One need only glance at the full name and the 
titles [a total of 23J of the new viceroy to realize that he 
was a man of more than ordinary distinction.'' 6 
Professor John Caughey observes several factors 
influencing the viceroy. First, he says, the viceroy's 
simple ignorance of the situation changed when Fray Junipero 
Serra, president of the California missions, visited Mexico 
City in 1773 and beseeched Bucareli for support. Serra's 
plea moved the deeply pious man viceroy. Second, he cites 
Captain Juan Bautista de Anza's proposal to secure an 
overland route to the California missions as influential. 
Third, Caughey argues, perhaps ~'most influential was his 
CBucareli's) realization of the strategic value of the 
Spanish outposts in California.'' 7 
Bobb, whose biography of the viceroy is not unkind, 
scoffs at both Chapman and Caughey's assertions, charging 
''the projects''--and he includes Anza's expeditions--''did 
e Chapman, Spanish Period, 242u 
6 Chapman, Spanish Period, 269. 
7 Caughey, 137-38. See also Bobb, 162-63. 
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nc•t •:•riginate with the viceroy'' at all. ''In fact, during 
his entire viceregency Don Antonio was the source of very 
few original concepts.''s Bobb argues that Bucareli did 
little more than follow orders from Spain or take action on 
the suggestions of Galvez. 9 Most recent scholarship 
generally accepts Bobb's conclusion. California historian C. 
Alan Hutchinson, for example, suggests that ''official'' 
hands almost exclusively guided Bucareli's actions. 10 
Nevertheless, when in 1773 new reports of Russian 
encroachments arrived from Spain it was Viceroy Bucareli who 
signed the orders sending an expedition north. 
THE JUAN PEREZ EXPEDITION 
In July of 1773 Bucareli instructed Juan Perez, chief 
navigator at San Blas, to draw up and submit plans for an 
expedition to reconnoiter the northwest coast. Chosen 
specifically because he had the most experience of any in 
the department, Perez had been stationed at San Blas since 
1767. Although he never rose higher in station than the rank 
of ensign (pilot first-class) Perez, recorded Bucareli, was 
''the only person with sufficient experience and service in 
the Department of San Blas to undertake the commission.'' 11 
a Bobb, 164. 
9 Bobb, 270. 
1 ° C. Alan Hutchinson, Frontier Settlement in 
California, 1769-1835 <New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1969) 1-43. See also Richman, 62-89, and Cook, 41-84. 
11 Bucareli to Arriaga. Cited in Thurman, 78-79. 
48 
A veteran of the Manila Galleon service, Perez piloted 
one of the initial vessels to visit Monterey in 1768-69. He 
was also the first Spaniard of the eighteenth century to 
enter both the port of Monterey and the port of San Diego. 
Additionally, according to one account, he saved the Alta 
California missions from imminent starvation in 1770. 12 
Perez's detailed plans demonstrated a thorough 
knowledge of the Pacific. Four central points can be 
delineated: the voyage should be undertaken in the newly 
constructed frigate Santiago; the voyage should be launched 
in either December, January, or February; a year's supplies 
should be taken; and, crew members should be recruited in 
part from the California presidios. 13 Bucareli, in turn, 
then relayed his proposals to Minister Julian de Arriaga in 
Madrid. Upon learning of the plans Carlos III ordered the 
assignment of six new naval officers and a new pilot to San 
Blas, and gave full support to the Perez expedition. 
Perez received secret orders December 24, 1773, 
directing him ''to ascend to the latitude which he considers 
suitable, keeping in mind that the landing is to be made at 
60 degrees of latitude.'' He was then to reconnoiter the 
coast, ''never lc•sing sight of it,'' and to e~;plc•re it as 
opportunity presented itself without, however, attempting 
any permanent settlement; and, as landings occurred 
12 Donald C. Cutter, ed., The California Coast: ~ 
Bilingual Edition of Documents from the Sutro Collection 
<Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969) xvii. 
13 Thurman, 120. 
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possession was to be taken in the name of Carlos III with a 
cross being erected beneath which a buried bottle would 
contain supporting documentation. 
In the event that foreign settlements be detected, 
Perez should avoid contact and sail north to accomplish his 
duties. Were contact with foreigners unavoidable he should 
conceal the purpose of the voyage. The expedition was also 
charged with investigating the commercial potential of the 
north, to search for ''spices, drugs or aromatics, wheat, 
barley, corn, beans, chick-peas ..•. precious stones or 
articles which our nation considers valuable.'' 14 Indians 
were to be treated kindly if encountered: six-hundred forty-
eight bundles of beads and cloth were included for the 
purpose of ensuring good relations with the native 
Americans. Finally, Bucareli instructed Perez to deliver 
provisions to Monterey. 1 !5 
At midnight January 24, 1774, the Santiago set sail 
with a crew of 86. 1 ~ In keeping with normal practise the 
vessel launched itself well into the Pacific to avoid 
relentless southwest ocean currents. To sail north meant, in 
effect, to veer in a wide arc generally northwest then 
14 Manuel P. Servin, trans., ''The Instructions of 
Viceroy Bucareli to Ensign Juan Perez.'' California 
Historical Society Quarterly 40 (1961): 240-41. 
1 !5 Servin, 239. 
1 G Bucareli was took no chances that illness or other 
deprivation might waylay the intentions of the Crown--the 
ship's complement registered fully twenty-two more than 
capacity. Thurman, 127-28. 
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follow the ocean currents southward along the coast. Despite 
orders not to stop until Monterey Cand there only brief lyl 
Perez lay anchor in San Diego in mid-March to repair a leak 
sprung in the hull. 17 While Fray Serra disembarked March 13, 
the vessel only turned north again April 5. On May 8 the 
Santiago landed at Monterey to unload supplies where the 
expedition's two chaplains, Fray Tomas de la Pena and Fray 
Juan Crespi, came aboard. 
After another month-long layover the vessel set to sea 
June 11, but calm seas prevailed for weeks and the 
expedition made scant progress until July. Edging ever 
northward, the prevailing weather brought rain, fog, and 
increasingly cold temperatures. Fray Pena recorded a typical 
entry in his July diary: 
At dawn on the thirteenth the wind continued at 
west-northwest, although it was not so strong, and 
the sky was clear as during the night, but at 
seven o'clock it was overcast again. At noon it 
cleared, and the navigating officers got an 
observation in 48 degrees 55 minutes north 
latitude .... During the afternoon the sky became 
overcast again. About seven o'clock the wind 
hauled to the southwest, very fresh, and the 
course was changed to the northwest. At that hour 
so thick a fog came on that barely the prow of the 
ship could be seen and it was so wet that it 
seemed to be raining. Thus it continued ••. 18 
On the 15th Perez decided to steer toward the coast 
with the intention of making a necessary landing to 
replenish dwindling water supplies. 19 The voyage continued, 
17 Thurman, 128. 
:1.e Servin, trans. 151. 
:I. '9 Palau, 46. 
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then, sighting and baptizing the Queen Charlotte Islands in 
the name Santa Margarita. Native-Americans engaged the 
voyagers in friendly, if unintelligible, discourse and, 
although only two saw fit to board the vessel, surrounded 
the Santiago at one point with 21 canoes. 2 ° Finally, at a 
North latitude of 55 degrees Perez, having failed to land 
anywhere on the coast and take possession in the name of the 
Crown as instructed, turned the Santiago around and headed 
south. 
On August 8, 1774, the Santiago dropped anchor off 
Nootka Sound, ''a place which it seemed ideal to claim.'' 
Indians paddled out in large canoes and eagerly traded with 
the Spanish sailors. Forthwith, the ensign organized and 
launched a shore party, but, he recorded in his journal: 
As I was preparing to set out for land, the West 
wind suddenly arose so fiercely that in an instant 
the sea swelled in such a way as to cause alarm. 
The anchorage, which extended four or five leagues 
out to sea, was unlevel, and the wind such to 
perturb the sea. In the light of this unexpected 
occurrence, and the fact that the frigate was 
dragging the anchor and heading rapidly onto the 
coast, I deemed it necessary to cut the cable and 
set sail lest we all perish. 2 ~ 
Continuing, the voyage encountered nine weeks of 
miserable weather and, as scurvy ravaged the crew, on 
September 27 the Santiago at last cast anchor at Monterey. 
After a recuperative layover the vessel left port October 9 
and Perez and his crew landed safely at San Blas November 3. 
20 Bancroft, NorthHest Coast, 154. 
2~ Cited in Palau, 46. 
C"·-· 
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The ensign immediately forwarded the ship's logs to Bucareli 
in Mexico City, apologizing for having not fully completed 
the orders given him. Bucareli nonetheless congratulated 
Per~z for ,,although everything desired and planned for had 
not been achieved, the information obtained was of value and 
extended knowledge to an extent which would make sailing to 
higher latitudes easier.'' 22 Bucareli expressed similar 
sentiments to Minister Arriaga in Madrid, and noted 
immediate plans for a second voyage--an expedition that 
Perez would not lead, but would instead be relegated to 
second-in-command of the pilot vessel. 
THE HEZETA EXPEDITION 
Lieutenant Bruno de Hezeta and five other officers 
despatched from Spain to San Blas by Carlos III arrived at 
the naval department in the early fall of 1775. Bucareli 
commissioned Hezeta to lead the three-vessel expedition, the 
instructions for which largely duplicated those given to 
Perez except that a latitude of 65 degrees North rather than 
60 was sought. The second vessel, the schooner Felicidad 
(more commonly known by its alias, Sonora) would be 
captained by Juan de Ayala, seconded by Juan Francisco de la 
Bodega y Quadra, and steered by Antonio Mourelle. 23 
22 Cited in Palau, 47. 
23 Mounting just two sails and scarcely 36 feet in 
length, the second vessel gave the expedition three added 
capabilities: to be able to explore the shallow details of 
the coast where the larger ship could not enter; to add 
maneuverability in tight spots where the vessels had been 
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Accompanying the larger vessels the packet-boat San Carlos, 
captained by Miguel Manrique and seconded by Jose de 
Canziares, had orders to break off and explore San Francisco 
Bay. 
Almost immediately after the vessels set to sea March 
16, Manrique went quite mad. Imagining his person to be in 
considerable danger, he armed himself with any num~er of 
pistols to ward off would-be assassins. Having brought the 
situation under control, Hezeta transferred Ayala to the San 
Carlos to take over Manrique's command and returned the 
unfortunate officer to San Blas, temporarily delaying the 
mission. In Ayala's absence command of the Sonora fell to 
Bodega; and the vessels were re-launched from San Blas March 
19. 
Progress proved fitful. Although the San Carlos broke 
away March 25 to explore San Francisco Bay, contrary weather 
actually blew the vessels south of the latitude of San Blas, 
and not until late May did they pass the latitude of 
Monterey. In early June the expedition dropped anchor at 
Trinidad Bay, California, at North latitude 41 degrees 03 
minutes, roughly between Cape Mendocino and Cape Blanco. And 
on June 11 a shore party took possession in the prescribed 
manner. Amongst a crowd of seamen and friendly native-
Americans, Fray Palou recorded: 
••• the Father preacher Fray Miguel de la Campa 
sang the Mass, during which many of those who had 
instructed to reconnoiter; and, the smaller vessel would 
make shore landings and possession taking easier for the 
former two reasons. See Thurman, 145, 149. 
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landed took communion. In the Mass the father gave 
his talk, exhorting them all to continue the 
voyage cheerfully until the desired purpose should 
be attained.~4 
Additionally, the crew erected a cross and beneath it buried 
a bottle with attendant documentation. 
July 13, 1775, the vessels dropped anchor near Point 
Grenville, Washington. The flagship's crew engaged the 
native-Americans in friendly discourse, trading and 
bartering, while the schooner some miles north laun~hed a 
shore party to find fresh water. The six sailors Bodega 
deployed on shore were caught unawares by hostile Indians 
and ''torn in pieces,'' as was the launch. 2~ In retaliation 
Bodega's crew opened fire on some of the Indians' canoes 
near the ship, and killed several of the occupants. Bodega 
wanted to deploy a larger shore party to exact a more 
substantive vengeance but a council of the expedition's 
officers dissuaded him. 
The council also discussed the advisability of sending 
the Sonora back to Monterey because of her small size--but 
Bodega and Mourelle insisted on completing their mission. 
Said Bodega of his vessel: 
153. 
..• there is no hiding her small size, bad 
steering, frailty, slowness, and the fact that I 
am forced to give more sail than should be 
necessary. All these reasons •.. should have been 
brought to his Excellency's notice by those 
responsible, informing him of the danger her 
24 From the journal of Fray Palou. Cited in Thurman, 
2~ Bancroft, Northwest Coast, 161. 
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attributes constitute. However, what is done is 
done, and no fear will stand in our way. 26 
Setting out to sea directly westward on the 14th, by the 
19th Perez advised that because of sickness (scurvy), ill 
winds, and given the lateness of the season, the expedition 
turn southward. Again, Bodega and Mourelle protested, and 
Hezeta, relenting to their pressure, ordered the expedition 
to ci::1ntinue. 
Then, as is perhaps well known, in the pitch of night 
July 31 the schooner and her flagship separated. Mourelle 
recorded: 
On the 31st it continued to be so dark that even 
during the day we could not see the frigate. 
On the 1st of August at day-break we had the 
same dark weather, so that we could not 
distinguish at half a league's distance, nor had 
we sight of the frigate: we kept on however ••• 27 
Bodega apparently wasted no time in determining the 
Sonora's course of action: 
At dawn ••• ! resolved, in pursuance of my 
instructions, to continue the explorations alone, 
even though I took into consideration the advanced 
season, and the shortage of water. 2 s 
:26 Cited in Palau, 50. 
27 Mourelle, Francisco Antonio, ,,Journal of a Voyage 
in 1775,'' Trans by Daines Barrington. Voyage of the Sonora 
in the Second Bucareli Expedition to Explore the Northwest 
Coast ••• 1775 by Daines Barrington (San Francisco, 1920) 501. 
29 Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra, Expeditions in 
the Years 1775 and 1779 towards the #est Coast of North 
Rmerica, trans. G.F Barwick. (Provincial Archives of British 
Columbia, Victoria, B.C.) 3-4. 
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Also within hours of the parting, at latitude 46 degrees 42 
minutes North, the officers on the Santiago decided to head 
south for the very reasons earlier complained of by Perez. 
First sailing north to 49 degrees 30 minutes--''in the 
region of Nootka,''--the Santiago turned southward following 
the shore. 29 On August 17 Hezeta became the first European 
to espy the Columbia River. Continuing, the vessel at length 
entered the harbor at Monterey August 29, and put ashore 35 
men afflicted with scurvy, one of whom did not survive. 
Bodega meanwhile, apparently with full support from his 
crew continued northward, reaching a North latitude of 58 
eight degrees on two occasions, and taking possession twice 
in the name of the Spanish Crown. September B, with a crew 
so wracked by scurvy that most were functionally incapable 
of carrying out their duties, the tiny vessel headed south. 
Recorded Bodega: 
••• seven men were discovered with scurvy, some 
at the mouth and others with various pains which 
impeded the movement of their legs, from which 
circumstances there remained only two men in each 
watch, one of whom was indispensable for handling 
the rudder . 
... I knew it would be impossible even though I 
e~erted myself to sail further north to a higher 
latitude. And even the return trip would be 
doubtful if the winds freshened vigorously, seeing 
we did not have enough men to handle the ship, and 
therefore I resolved to return •..• reconnoitering 
the coast whenever I found it possible. 30 
2'9 Bancroft, Northwest Coast, 162. 
3 ° Cited in Thurman, 160. See also Mourelle's account 
in Barrington, 511-12. 
57 
Conditions on board so deteriorated because of the sickness 
that both Bodega and Mourelle found it necessary to pitch in 
and help with the necessary, mundane sailing chores just to 
keep the ship afloat. 
After reaching Monterey October 7, and as soon as the 
men had sufficiently recovered, both vessels left for San 
Blas. On November 10, just two days out of Monterey, Juan 
Perez died. 
ARTEAGA AND BODEGA 
Even before the Hezeta expedition had returned to San 
Blas, Bucareli busily planned another foray. He directed 
Lieutenant Ignacio Arteaga and Francisco Hijosa, shipping 
master at San Blas, to draw up plans including provisions 
for fully arming the next expedition. International events, 
however, temporarily sidelined the project. The revolution 
in Britain's American colonies drew both France and Spain's 
attention elsewhere, and Madrid indefinitely postponed the 
next expedition. 
The northwest coast, however, received other visitors 
in the Spanish absence. In search of the elusive Strait of 
Anian, and following orders very much like those of Juan 
Perez, in the early spring of 1778 Great Britain's 
illustrious Captain James Cook reconnoitered the northwest 
coast. Directed to survey the coast between 45 degrees and 
65 degrees North latitude, to avoid any Spanish settlements, 
and, fully aware of the 20,000 pound reward for finding the 
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northwest passage, to take possession in the name of the 
British Crown wherever possible. 31 Importantly, he landed at 
Nootka Sound, and his crew conducted considerable trade with 
the Indians there. Although Cook did not survive his third 
famous voyage, his published journals appeared in Europe in 
1784 to considerable effect, and in marked contrast with the 
secrecy of Spanish expeditions. 
By 1778 Bucareli's plans for another Spanish expedition 
resumed. Two new frigates were stocked and readied for 
service, with Arteaga leading the expedition from the 
flagship Princesa, seconded by Lieutenant Fernandez Quiros, 
and with Bodega and Mourelle occupying similar positions on 
the second vessel, the Favorita. On February 11, 1779, the 
expedition sailed, the Princesa with a crew of 98 and the 
Favarita with 100. Instructions again largely duplicated 
those given to Perez, with two exceptions. First, Bucareli 
ordered the heavily armed expedition to attain a North 
latitude of 70 degrees; and, second, to arrest James Cook, 
if enco1..mtered. 
Sailing north, and not nearing the coast until Alaska, 
the vessels did not land between 42 degrees and 55 degrees 
North latitude, and they visited California only on the 
route south. The vessels dropped anchor off the Alaskan 
coast in early May where a landing party gathered water, 
31 Bancroft, Northwest Coast, 168-69. See also Barry M. 
Gough, ''The Northwest Coast in Late Eighteenth Century 
British Expansion,'' Western Shore, ed. Thomas Vaughan 
CPortland: Oregon Historical Society, 1976) 52-53. 
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firewood and ballast. From there the crews mapped shores, 
inlets and bays, and took possession in the name of Carlos 
III. While the native-Americans received friendly treatment, 
Arteaga and Bodega took precautions to avoid a recurrence of 
the massacre during the Hezeta expedition. 
The expedition also gathered much valuable ethnographic 
information, as Bodega noted in his journal: 
They cover their heads with hats well woven from 
the inner bark of a tree, and shaped like a 
funnel. On their wrists they wear bracelets of 
copper, iron, or whalebone, and on their neck 
sundry rows of the beads they make of bone, and 
ears, twisted wires of the same metal, jet beads, 
and certain little globules from a gum, which 
resemble topazes. 32 
The expedition again encountered native-Americans at the 
most northerly point reached, 60 degrees 13 minutes. 
By the end of July an old nemesis--scurvy--had 
afflicted yet another expedition and so it too turned toward 
the south, despite Bodega's protestations. The vessels 
drifted apart before meeting again at Trinidad Bay, 
California, and continued from there on to San Fr~ncisco for 
a six week recuperative stop. The layover ended abruptly 
60 
when a courier brought news of war between Spain and Britain 
and of Viceroy Bucareli's death. 
Spanish officials strove to establish a tenable 
presence on the northwest coast in the 1770's. As he 
received orders and warnings from his superiors Viceroy 
Bucareli organized and directed New Spain's efforts. Juan 
32 Bodega, 37. 
Perez in 1774 reconnoitered the northern shores, but never 
landed or took possession. The following year Bodega sailed 
to the Alaskan panhandle and took possession at several 
locations, while Hezeta, the expedition leader, at lower 
latitudes took possession and became the first non-Indian to 
espy the Columbia River. Under Arteaga and Bodega's 
leadership, the last Bucareli directed expedition in 1779 
explored the coast of Alaska in some detail, and took 
possession in the name of the Crown at several locations. 
Spain obviously wanted a territorial claim to the 
northwest coast that would be respected by its rivals. Given 
the expeditions' instructions, in Spain's estimation 
possession-taking clearly granted the legitimacy sought. 
Not surprisingly then, history dwells on the success of 
possession-taking as the unit by which to measure the 




The significance and accomplishments of the voyages of 
Perez, Hezeta and Bodega, and Arteaga and Bodega have 
stimulated discussion among scholars. This takes into 
account more than sucLessfully charting an island or a piece 
of coastline (not that such actions are considered 
unimportant per se). For example, Viceroy Bucareli charged 
these voyagers with specific instructions. How successfully 
did the mariners complete their appointed tasks? Did the 
relative success of a given expedition much matter; and, to 
the extent that it did (or did not>, what are the terms used 
to define it? 
History judges these men within two general contexts, 
two sets of terms. The most fundamental yet easily 
overlooked criterion for the historian is the cultural 
Heltanschauung of which he or she is a part, and success is 
accordingly defined in these terms. This is of course 
necessary in order for a work to be relevant to readers who, 
after all, also comprise a part of the same general 
worldview. But it is not enough. The principle of 
''scholarly detachment'' should always apply to research and 
analysis. One should attempt to distance oneself from the 
subject of study and then come to some ''objective'' 
conclusion about it. Obviously, all but the most vain 
understand the inherent contradiction: the simple selection 
of a topic is itself a prejudiced decision. As William H. 
McNeil noted in his 1986 presidential address to the 
American Historical Association: 
••. the arrangement of facts to make history 
involv[esJ subjective judgements and intellectual 
choices that ha[veJ little or nothing to do with 
source criticism, scientific or otherwise. 1 
This is not to suggest that history is neither worth writing 
nor reading, but, rather, that one must approach it with a 
critical eye, ever on the lookout for lapses in logic, bias, 
and so on. 
This notion presages the second context in which 
historians have evaluated Perez, Hezeta, Bodega, and 
Arteaga; that is, the historian's attempt to understand an 
event as it had been understood by those living when it 
occurred. It is not the intention of this paper to digress 
into a lecture on the merits of historiographical study, but 
only to set the particular terms of this chapter of enquiry. 
All the authoritative accounts of the Bucareli-directed 
voyages fall into the category of attempted ~~scholarly 
detachment.'' One might argue this is so quite by 
definition; after all, clearly none of the authors knowingly 
expressed a biased opinion thought to be anything other than 
the truth, i.e., a factual representation of reality. 
i William H. McNeil, 
History, and Historians.'' 
( 1986) : 1. 
''Mythistory, or Truth, Myth, 
Rmerican Historical Review 91 
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Appropriately, the respective judgements granted Perez, 
Hezeta, Bodega, and Arteaga in history vary. 
WHITHER JUAN PEREZ 
Ensign Perez's place in history has remained largely 
static and not especially flattering to the Mallorcan 
mariner. Generally portrayed as an unforceful character 
lacking in fundamental courage, he has been roundly 
condemned. The particular charges against him are 
essentially two, the more serious of which stems from his 
failure to land anywhere on the coast and take possession 
for the Spanish Crown as ordered by Viceroy Bucareli. 
Additionally damning, Perez decided to turn back toward San 
Blas rather than pressing ahead to 60 degrees North 
latitude, again as instructed. 
To understand the significance of the ensign's failure 
to take possession one must appreciate the enormous 
importance Spain attached to the ritual. Without the 
declaration of formal ownership derived from the traditional 
formulary, Spain of necessity had to concede that these 
lands were open to all comers. Thus, to effectively 
circumvent foreign encroachments on the coast, Bucareli 
instructed Perez and his successors to take possession, that 
is, to declare ownership. 
Yet at the same time, official Spanish preoccupation 
with the ritual stood in a dialectical relationship to legal 
precedent. The 1670 Treaty of Madrid, penned by Spain and 
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Britain, recognized ownership of colonial posessions in the 
New World derived by uti possidetis, that is, by effective 
occupation. 2 Article Seven of the treaty read: 
The Most Serene King of Great Britain <Charles Ill 
and his heirs and successors shall enjoy, have and 
possess in perpetuity, with full right of 
sovereignty, ownership and possession, all the 
lands, provinces, islands, colonies and dominions 
situated in the West Indies or in any part of 
America, which said King of Great Britain and his 
subjects have and possess at present. 3 
The treaty clearly acknowledged what Britain and other non-
Catholic European nations had long argued, that occupation 
determined ownership. 4 The issue with regard to the 
northwest littoral, however, proved to be intractable, in 
spite of the Madrid agreement. 
As noted, Spain, via Bucareli's instructions, continued 
to believe that successful application of the ritual would 
legally protect its ''possessions.'' Paradoxically, Britain 
too acknowledged the inherent legality of the formulary, the 
Treaty of Madrid--and uti possidetis--notwithstanding. James 
Cook's 1776 orders, in part, read: 
You are ..• to take possession, in the name of the 
King of Great Britain, of convenient situations in 
such countries as you may discover ••. by setting up 
proper marks and inscriptions, as first 
discoverers and possessors.e 
2 Cook, 47, 152. 
2 Gordon Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and 
Conflicts in Central and North Rmerica and the Caribbean 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941) 120. 
4 George Woodcock, ''Captain Cook at Nootka: The 
Political Aftermath,'' History Today 28 (1978): 98. 
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As should be readily apparent, Bucareli's instructions 
to Perez were at best legally ambiguous. While the formulary 
obviously held great importance for the Spaniards, it had 
been--at least technically--supplanted a hundred years 
earlier. Yet Britain also continued to respect the premise 
of the formulary, as demonstrated by Cook's orders. 
Wagner dates the practice of ritualized Iberian 
possession-taking to late fifteenth century Portuguese 
voyages to the west coast of Africa.G In following the 
course of the formulary's evolution, he finds it had become 
common practise for the Spanish by 1500. What might 
consummate the act in the sixteenth century included cutting 
trees, gathering water, piling stones in a distinctive 
mound-shape, and, especially, erecting crosses beneath which 
both bottles with documentation inside would be buried and 
mass would be said. 
Upon discovering the Pacific Ocean's eastern shore in 
1513 Balboa heaped stones into the shape of an altar, 
inscribed the Crown's name upon it, and cut trees such that 
they might be easily visible, to demonstrate Spanish 
ownership. Balboa is often misrepresented as having taken 
possession of the whole coast for Spain. This is clearly 
erroneous, otherwise Spain need never have concerned itself 
~ Cited in Woodcock, 97. See also Manuel Servin, 
''Religious Aspects of Symbolic Acts of Sovereignty.'' The 
Rmericas 13 C1957): 263-64. 
6 Unless otherwise noted the bulk of the following 
information has been taken from Henry R. Wagner, ''The 
Creation of Rights of Sovereignty through Symbolic Acts.'' 
Pacific Historical Review 7 (1938): 297-327. 
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with Bucareli's possession-taking instructions given to 
Perez and others. Here or elsewhere, native-Americans 
witnessing the act would have had a requerimiento 7 of sorts 
read to them with the intended effect to establish a basis 
for the Spanish claim. As should be apparent, these rituals 
symbolized more permanent actions that might be taken, such 
as establishing a settlement. Notably, officers took actions 
to attempt to ensure the crosses remained unmolested by the 
native-Americans, often to little effect.a 
By the 1770's Spanish colonial officials had developed 
an elaborate formula for possession-taking, and fully one-
third of Bucareli's instructions to Perez focused 
specifically on this symbolic action. The order read in 
part: 
In a loud voice he [Perez] said that in the name 
of His Majesty the King, Don Carlos III, Our 
Sovereign Cwhom may God Our Lord keep for many 
years •.. ) he, as captain of the frigate and by 
7 The requerimiento was the declaration Spanish 
officers were required to read to the Indians before 
engaging them in battle. It consisted largely of offering 
not to make war provided the native Americans agreed to 
embrace the Catholic faith as the One True Religion. In 
practise, however, the Spaniards often read the 
requerimiento out of earshot, in the dark of night, or after 
a battle had been waged. Additionally, even if read in the 
prescribed manner the native-Americans could scarcely have 
begun to understand Spanish or Latin. See Haring, 6. See 
also Lewis Hanke. Aristotle and the Rmerican Indians 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959) 16-18. 
9 The Iberians had no monopoly on ritualized 
possession-taking. Martin Frobisher followed a similar 
formula in Canada's north, as did Jaques Cartier in Quebec, 
and Sir Francis Drake on the northwest coast. These sailors 
also erected crosses <Drake left a plaque) and read a 
declaration in the name of their respective potentates. 
Wagner, ''The Creation of Rights,'' 306-08. 
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virtue of the order and instructions which in the 
royal name were given to him by the aforesaid Most 
Excellent Viceroy of New Spain CBucareliJ, was 
taking and took possession, was seizing and seized 
possession of this land ••. which he has discovered 
forever and ever in the said name of the Royal 
Crown .•• as its own property ••• by reason of the 
Donation and Bull of the Very Holy Father 
Alexander VI ••• given at Rome on May 4 of the year 
1493. 9 
Bucareli also instructed Perez to erect a cross transported 
from San Blas, and to bury beneath it a bottle which housed 
papers testifying to the veracity of the claim. Finally, the 
orders directed the ship's chaplains to say mass, and lead 
the sailors in hymn. 10 
Despite the fact that in the late eighteenth century--
as in the late twentieth--might often determined right in 
international disputes, Spain undeniably felt it stood on 
solid ground with regard to possession gained by such 
means. 11 As earlier noted, primarily the fear of Russian 
encroachments engendered the Perez expedition. Thus, without 
immediate plans for settlement, the success of an 
expedition--indeed, the success of Spain's general plan to 
monopolize more than 2,000 miles of shoreline and the 
9 Servin, 244-45. 
10 It should be noted that no such possession-taking 
occurred in California. It was not necessary, given the 
establishment of the missions. Wagner, ''The Creation of 
Rights,'' 31.1. 
11 Allusion is made specifically to the Nootka Sound 
controversy of the mid-1790's between Spain and Britain from 
which Spain came away empty handed not so much because 
Britain disputed the Spanish claim on legal grounds--
although it did, ostensibly--as that Spain d~red not risk 
war with its more powerful rival. See Cook. 
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unknown hinterland it sheltered--required strict adherence 
to Bucareli's carefully scripted instructions. Yet Perez 
failed to fulfill this most important of his orders. Why? 
The one attempt Perez made to land and claim possession 
foundered off the upper west shore of Vancouver Island. By 
all accounts the sudden squall that nearly swamped the 
Santiago precluded taking possession at Nootka Sound, 
despite the attempted launch. Similarly, Perez's action in 
cutting loose the anchor line and heading out to sea is 
considered prudent. The question raised by most scholars is 
not with this event as such but, instead, why no other 
attempt to land occurred. The generally accepted conclusion 
can best be seen in light of Perez's decision to turn south 
rather than to continue to 60 degrees North latitude. 
As noted, the ensign argued that dwindling water 
supplies and his crew's sickness from scurvy forced him to 
turn southward. Many scholars find these excuses inadequate 
and cowardly. For others, however, Perez's stature remains 
largely untarnished by the decision. Three works based on 
the examination of primary evidence show an inclination to 
favor Perez. Loosely, it is fair to conclude that earlier 
texts, such as Bancroft's C1880's>, favorably evaluate 
Perez, while the later works, such as Cook's (1'373), almost 
without exception have condemned him. 
Bancroft extols ensign Perez for the simple reason that 
the expedition, despite its technical failure on several 
counts, broke new ground in history. Perez, he notes: 
6'3 
... though he had not reached latitude 60 degrees, 
as instructed, nor discovered any good ports, nor 
landed anywhere to take possession for Spain, nor 
found either foreign establishment or proof of 
their non-existence, he had still gained the honor 
of having discovered practically the whole 
Northwest Coast. He had surveyed a large portion 
of the two great islands that make up the coast of 
British Columbia, giving the first description of 
the natives; he had seen and described, though 
vaguely and from a distance, nearly all of the 
Washington coast, and a large part of Oregon. He 
had given to his nation whatever of credit and 
territorial claims may be founded on the mere act 
of first discovery. 12 
In short, being first, quite by definition meant going where 
none (except Indians) had gone before, thus history must 
recognize--and congratulate--the accomplishment. 
The father of American borderlands history Herbert 
Eugene Bolton, whose assessment of Perez concurs with 
Bancroft's, on this count opines: 
To the simple sailors with Perez the terrors of 
the uncharted North Pacific were no less real than 
those which cowed the crews of Columbus when he 
ventured across the mysterious Sea of the West. To 
the officers assembled these seemed reasons enough 
for veering to the shore, even though they were 
nine wide degrees short of the goal marked on the 
map by the hard-driving Bucareli. 13 
Clearly, 'both of these historians draw their primary 
measure of Perez from the fact that he was the first to go 
where none had gone before. Other evidence has been 
12 Bancroft, Northwest Coast, 156-57. 
1 :ii Herbert Eugene Bolton, Fray Jaan Crespi: Missionary 
Explorer on the Pacific Coast, 1769-1774. 1927. (New York: 
AMS Press, 1971) 1. Named chair of the history department at 
the University of California, Berkeley, in 1919, the 
following year Bolton was appointmented director of the 
Bancroft Library. See John Francis Bannon, Herbert Eugene 
Bolton, The Historian and the Man, 1870-1953 (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1978) xvi. 
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marshalled to defend this approach. Bolton, for example, 
cites bad weather as the real culprit in Perez's inability 
to land. 14 But he does not stop there; he would have Perez 
as a North Coast Odysseus stumped only by Fate in the 
pursuit of his goal. 1 ~ Bancroft, however, despite praising 
the ensign, also questions ''Whether Perez made the best use 
of his opportunities ••. '' 16 But the illustrious bookseller 
is not striving to have it both ways, concluding, ''Perez, a 
bold and experienced pilot, was a better judge than I.'' 17 
Chapman is also quick to laud Perez, but this ranking 
is derived tangentially. Chapman's work focuses on the 
history of California. To that end, Perez made genuine 
contributions: he led, for example, many supply runs from 
San Blas to the California presidios. From this valuable 
service Chapman's approach takes shape. He writes that Perez 
''was by far the most notable figure in the life of the 
province. '' 18 ; and, that ''none had worked more faithfully 
and unassumingly for the good of the new establishments.'' 19 
14 Boltc•n lvi. 
1~ Bc•lton, 1 vii. 
1& Bancrc:•ft, Northwest Coast, 157. 
17 Banc rc•f t, Northwest Coa:.:::t, 157. 
18 Chapman, Spanish Period, 276. In 1915 Chapman earned 
his Ph.D at the University of Calitornia, Berkeley, under 
the tutelage of Herbert Eugene Bolton. He subsequently 
taught history there until his death in 1941. See Bannon, 
102, 217-18. 
19 Chapman, Spanish Period, 278. 
Additionally, he accepts the bad weather argument endorsed 
by Bancroft and Bolton. 20 
Where Chapman differs from the other two Perez 
sympathizers is that his validation of the Mallorcan's worth 
derives from the psychological phenomenon of generalization. 
That is, Chapman appears predisposed to favorably evaluate 
Perez in all endeavors for his positive contributions to 
early California history. In a very real sense Chapman's 
estimation of Perez is a logical non-sequitur because the 
conclusion does not follow from the evidence. In fact, 
Chapman presents no evidence on this count, preferring 
instead to measure Perez by a criterion that does not apply: 
how successfully the mariner performed his duties as a 
captain of the California supply vessels is irrelevant vis-
a-vis how well he performed as head of the 1774 expedition 
to the Northwest coast. 
As one of Perez's many detractors, Wagner was the 
earliest and most vociferous: 
•.• [it was] a perfectly futile expedition. The 
fact is that Perez was entirely too timid for work 
in these northern waters. No good reason existed 
for not going up to 60 degrees as ordered, and for 
not landing and taking possession, which was the 
real object in sending him. 2 ~ 
The expedition, in other words, failed because ensign Perez 
proved altogether incapable of fulfilling the prime 
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Wagner, ''Sierra's Account,'' 204. As 
was voluminous, such criticism can be 
See also Wagner, Cartography, 172-74. 
Wagner's 
fottnd in many 
directive, and his defense for not following orders is 
untenable. 
Likewise, Michael Thurman blasts Perez for all the 
reasons Wagner advances, but his invective includes 
criticism for defying orders not to stop anywhere before 
Monterey Cthe month-long layover in San Diego did violate 
Bucareli's instructions), and suggests that the water 
shortage either was pre-meditated Cat worst) or simply a 
sign of incompetence Cat best). 22 
Like Wagner and Thurman, Warren Cook chides the ensign 
for making but one attempt to land; and like Thurman he says 
that Perez needlessly wasted time in San Diego. But Cook 
goes even further, all but labeling the Mallorcan a coward. 
''Perez seems to have lacked in full measure the intrepid 
qualities requisite for meeting the challenges of his 
mission,'' the historian charges. 23 The invective continues, 
but for our purposes this statement is especially important 
for another reason, because it hints at the very different 
approach taken by the Perez-detractors vis-a-vis the Perez-
sympathizers. 
Cook, Thurman, Wagner, and others who, based on the 
examination of primary documents, see in Perez failure 
rather than success, do so in large measure because of the 
achievements gained by subsequent expeditions. 24 Cook's 
:22 Thurman, 131, 138-40. 
2~ Cook, 62. 
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comment is a veiled comparison of Perez to Hezeta, Arteaga, 
and especially to Bodega, although names are not used as 
such. The Bancroft-Bolton approach can be tacitly 
disregarded as simplistic and narrow. Perez's first-
discovery was meaningless legally, for all accounts here 
discussed recognize and accept the necessity of formal 
possession-taking. And as every historical account stresses 
the singular importance of possession-taking, anything less 
in fact signaled failure. Later expeditionary successes 
buttress this conclusion. That is, the bad weather argument 
appears ludicrous, retrospectively, when later voyagers met 
and prevailed over similar conditions without the benefit of 
greater--if not lesser, as was the case with Bodega and 
Mourelle--resources. 
Analyses of the Perez expedition based on primary-
sourced exist in short supply. More plentiful secondary 
analyses tend generally to criticize the ensign. 2~ In doing 
so they typically cite Wagner, Thurman, and Cook, as well as 
utilizing the respective expedition journals. Of course, 
24 See also Donald C. Cutter, ~~Spain and the Oregon 
Coast,'' Western Shore, ed. Thomas Vaughan CPortland: Oregon 
Historical Society, 1976) 28-46; Barry M. Gough, Distant 
Dominion~ Britain and the Northuest Coast of North Rmerica~ 
1579-1809 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
1980) 93-94; Derek Pethick, First Rpproaches to the 
Northuest Coast <Vancouver: J.J. Douglas Ltd., 1976) 43-44; 
and, Richman, 118. 
2~ This includes four Masters theses: Mildred 
Delongchamp C1946), Tomas Bartroli C1960l, Oakah L. Jones 
C1960), and Herbert K. Beals (1983--see the bibliography of 
this paper for full citations). For a somewhat pedestrian 
presentation see John Kendrick, The Men uith Wooden Feet 
<Toronto: NC Press Limited, 1986) 9-26. 
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many accounts simply relay the ,,facts'' without evaluating 
the relative success of the voyage. This is most typical of 
the peripheral accounts such as those of Bernard Bobb, John 
Caughey, and Robin Fisher. 2 6 
Before moving into a discussion of the Hezeta 
expedition it should be noted that at least one other 
defense of Perez's actions has been raised. In a very short 
study of Perez's final days, James G. Caster suggests that 
an undetermined illness afflicted the mariner and might well 
have caused him to act in a ''capricious'' way, thus lending 
to a frame of mind that might disregard orders. 27 
Finally, it is also instructive to note that several 
authors cite Perez's contemporaries as being rather critical 
of him. Bancroft, for example, notes Mourelle's 1791 
allegation that Perez's performance bordered on the 
inexcusable. On a coastline that stymied the ensign 
subsequent voyagers visited many hospitable natural harbors, 
Mourelle complained. 29 More suggestive, yet equally telling, 
Bucareli's fulsome praise of the voyage, Barry Gough, among 
others, interprets as evincing the viceroy's ''clear 
disappointment.''29 
26 See citations for Robin Fisher, Caughey, and Bobb in 
the bibliography of this paper. 
27 James G. Caster, ,,The Last Days of Juan Perez, The 
Mallorcan Mariner,'' Journal of the #est 2 C1963): 15-21. 
29 Bancroft, Northwest Coast, 157. 
29 Gough, Distant Dominion, '34. 
In conclusion, Perez has been on balance, if not 
exactly vilified, at least viewed with mild contempt. And, 
while the works here utilized are not exhaustive they 
represent the general corpus of work in English on the 
subject. To fully understand the context of the criticism, 
because much of the polemic stems from comparison with his 
colleagues from the Naval Station at San Blas, it is 
necessary to examine next the historical literature's 
treatment of the Hezeta and of the Arteaga expeditions, 
beginning with the former. 
HEZETA AND BODEGA, 1775 
Scholars unanimously extol the accomplishments of the 
Hezeta expedition. On virtually no count is the endeavor 
deemed anything less than a complete success for Spanish 
interests. The credit, however, belongs not to expedition 
leader Bruno de Hezeta but to Juan Francisco de la Bodega y 
Quadra and Antonio Mourelle, Bodega's second-in-command. 
Additionally, as previously noted, the success of this 
expedition casts aspersions about the much criticized Ensign 
Juan Perez. 
Scholars overlook Hezeta for one very simple reason: 
the more significant achievements of the expedition occurred 
after his ship and the vessel commanded by Bodega parted, 
his turning southward and Bodega's continuing toward Alaska. 
Bodega, with the strong support of Mourelle, achieved the 
more substantive accomplishments of the expedition. Hezeta 
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is historically important as the expedition leader, and for 
earning some modest successes after the ships parted. Of 
course, often unstated in the literature is the inevitable 
comparison between the two vessels' captains. 
Professor Donald C. Cutter raises two commonly made 
points with regard to the relative merits of the two ships' 
officers. First, he writes: 
The intrepidness of these men [Bodega and 
MourelleJ is clearly demonstrated by the fact that 
the epic exploration was carried out with a 
somewhat reduced and undertrained crew. 30 
Not only did the crew of the Sonora suffer the common 
depredations of the sea--especially scurvy--but the men 
endured them in amounts nothing short of considerably heroic 
proportions. When the vessel at length reached Monterey the 
crew was so ill that even Bodega and Mourelle had to be 
carried ashore! 
In light of the ability and willingness on the part of 
Bodega to carry on despite sickness, Hezeta's decision to 
turn back pales. Writing for the majority, Cutter notes that 
Hezeta ''was not so daring as Mourelle and Bodega, but his 
acts of possession were the basis for the Spanish claim to 
the area as far north as the state of Washington.'' 31 In 
other words, where Perez failed completely to secure lands 
for the Crown, Hezeta achieved modest success. Bodega, on 
~0 Donald C. Cutter, ''California, Training Ground for 
Spanish Naval Heroes,'' California Historical Society 
Q.u.arterly 40 (1'361): 110. 
21 Cutter, "Training Grc•und," 114. 
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the other hand, accomplished as much, quite literally, as 
human endurance would bear. 
Scholars view Bodega's passion for adventure as nothing 
short of rapacious. On this count, amateur historian Derek 
Pethick presents the majority view using the courageous 
mariner's own words: 
••. the command of it has been delivered to me, and 
I must act according to the code of honor 
corresponding to my birth ••• if fortune were so 
adverse that it gave me no assistance, then it is 
a glory for posterity when each man dies at his 
post for the King,32 
The best evidence for Bodega's courage and, conversely, 
the squeamishness of the officers in the pilot ship 
(remember, Perez was Hezeta's second), can be found in the 
parting of the two vessels the night of July 31. As alluded 
to in Chapter III, essentially two opinions exist for why 
the ships parted: it was planned; or, it was accidental. 
Scholars who believe that Bodega and Mourelle acted in a 
premeditated fashion, such as Cook and Thurman, are also 
more likely to vilify Perez, and praise the former two 
mariners. Those who label the parting accidental, or are 
ambiguous about it, or those who mention nothing more than 
that the vessels parted and supply no especial reason for 
it, typically proffer a less harsh judgement of Perez (if 
judgmental at all). These historians, such as Bolton and 
Bancroft, also are more restrained in their praise of Bodega 
and Mourelle. Other works, such as Gough's, tend to be 
!al:::< Cited in Pethick, First Rpproaches~ 44. See also 
Bodega, 3-4. 
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inconclusive: he lashes out at Perez, as earlier noted, but 
says virtually nothing about the 1775 and 1779 expeditions. 
The sum of the evidence points clearly to a negative 
evaluation of Perez. 
Professor Chapman's treatment of the voyagers is a good 
case study of a disturbing pratfall that can trip the 
historian. First, he uses no relevant evidence to conclude 
that Perez was quite a success in his voyage north in 1774, 
and he all but completely ignores the eclipsing of the 
ensign's meager accomplishments by Hezeta and Bodega as a 
measure of him. Further, he ignores the influence of Perez 
in convincing Hezeta to turn southward (see Chapter III). 
Last, and quite despite his immodest claim to be on very 
familiar terms with archival materials, Chapman ignores the 
very obvious primary evidence that others (see Thurman, 
Cook, and even Bancroft citing the opinions of Bucareli and 
Mourelle) demonstrate paints a rather unflattering portrait 
of the ensign. Ironically, standing in juxtaposition to the 
Perez detractors, Chapman's apparent lapses highlight the 
basic conclusions others have come to with regard to Perez, 
Hezeta and Bodega. 
ARTEAGA AND BODEGA, 1779 
If Hezeta is often ignored in the literature, his 
notice is yet many times more evident than that of Arteaga, 
who led the last expedition to the northwest coast during 
Bucareli's tenure. While cartographically important, this 
7'-;J 
expedition, virtually all scholars agree, merits 
considerably less stature than the earlier two. Perez is 
given some measure of praise for being first in the region, 
breaking new ground, and, Hezeta-Bodega took the 
immeasurably important possession at various places along 
the coast. However, with regard to the primary impetus 
behind the voyages, the Arteaga expedition had little ground 
to break. 
Bancroft notes nothing more than its feat of mapping 
the coastline; Thurman's assessment of the expedition is 
similar; and, likewise, Chapman mentions only that the 
expedition achieved a ''careful exploration'' of the Alaskan 
coast. The only remotely comprehensive treatment the 
expedition receives is from Cook, who credits it with the 
mapping, and for having the unintended effect of inducing 
the Crown ''to rest on its laurels,'' secure in the 
erroneous belief that the coast held little interest for 
other European nations. For instilling a false sense of 
security in the Spanish court, Cook cites the expedition's 
failure to discover evidence either of Captain James Cook's 
visit or of a Russian presence in the northern waters. 33 
ONE, TWO, THREE 
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Without question the expedition of 1775 is seen as the 
most successful of the Bucareli years. To that end, its 
officers are accorded commensurate amounts of praise. Hezeta 
::;)::;! Ci:•o k , ·37 -98. 
gets credit for, one, being the expedition leader and, two, 
for possession-taking on the Oregon and Washington coasts. 
Bodega and Mourelle reap the greatest praise because their 
contributions speak of great intrepidness--certainly in the 
mold of the Conquistadores--and their possession-taking 
further north was of considerable geopolitical importance in 
Spain's estimation. 
For some scholars Juan Perez deserves real credit for 
being the first to brave the northerly waters, to go where 
none had gone before. Yet for most historians this 
accomplishment merits little cause for distinction. Perez 
failed because he was timorous, they conclude, and not at 
all--much to his disgrace--of the metal from which Bodega 
and Mourelle were hewn. 
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Scholars consider Ignacio Arteaga to be of no especial 
importance, despite his cartographical and possession-taking 
achievements. He receives scant historical treatment largely 
because his accomplishments neither broke substantive new 
ground, nor represented any particular strategic gain. 
In summation, then, scholars unequivocally rank the 
intrepid Bodega and Mourelle well above their colleagues. 
The cautious yet persevering Hezeta represents an honored 
second position. Arteaga occupies what might be best 
described as a neutral, if not ambivalent, position--not 
unsuccessful, just ignored--near Hezeta. Perez sits quite 
alone and scorned in the distant last position. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
The expeditions sent north from San Blas during the 
tenure of Viceroy Bucareli have in part been overlooked as a 
discreet subject of inquiry because the story they tell has 
no sense of dramatic closure. That is, as is frequently the 
case with general histories, and as is certainly the case 
with the literature surrounding this paper's subject, 
written history appears to seek out an unambiguous ending to 
a tale. While it may be that if one looks at the story of 
the three voyages of discovery--1774, 1775, and 1779--one 
can identify a beginning, a middle, and an end, along with 
several heroes and at least one chump, the story history 
prefers is the one that closes with the Spanish face-saving 
withdrawal from Nootka Sound in 1795. In that story, the 
voyages discussed earlier in this paper provide the opening 
act. 
Although almost 10 years of Spanish inactivity on the 
Northwest coast followed the Arteaga expedition, a renewed 
interest kindled in the late 1780's. The impetuses, again, 
generally resembled those of the sixteenth century, though 
fear of the British had grown exponentially. The result, 
most methodically presented by Professor Warren Cook, led, 
first, to the establishment of a Spanish settlement at 
Nootka Sound,i and, second, to a confrontation in the 1790's 
between Spain and Britain, when the latter challenged the 
Spanish claim. 2 Spain, traditionally allied with France 
against Britain, could count on no support from its neighbor 
torn apart by revolution. Unwilling to risk direct conflict 
with a more powerful adversary, Spain backed away from its 
claim to absolute sovereignty of the Pacific Northwest based 
on the Papal Bull of 1493, the right of first discovery 
(Juan Perez), and the possession-taking CHezeta and Bodega, 
et al:>. 
The Nootka Sound controversy thus climaxed the story of 
Spain's interest in the Northwest. Conveniently, it follows 
the traditional five-stage, Aristotilean course of narrative 
development: the ,,situation'' is nothing more than the geo-
political context, a late eighteenth century Hobbesian world 
of competing interests; the ,,complication'' is the mutually 
exclusive nature of the competing claims; the ,,crisis'' 
arrives with the simple passage of time, i.e., at Nootka in 
the 1790's; the ,,climax'' occurs with negotiations to avoid 
war; and, the ,,denouement'' completes the tale as Spain 
withdraws. Whether or not historians have traditionally 
sought out such sequences to identify as discreet historical 
~ In particular, see Bartroli, Cook, Jones, Manning, 
and Derek Pethick, The Hootka Connection~ Europe and the 
Northwest Passage~ 1790-1795 <Vancouver: Douglas & Mcintyre, 
1980). 
2 For a novel approach to the hammering out of the 
specifics of the settlement see Janet Fireman's article, 
,,The Seduction of George Vancouver: A Nootka Affair,'' 
Pacific Historical Review 56 (1987): 427-43. 
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topics, or whether they randomly impose such schematas atop 
events in itself represents a discreet subject; but for our 
purposes it is clear from a representative sampling of the 
literature on the Spanish presence in the Pacific Northwest 
that such a linear trajectory lending itself to the 
Aristotilean development exists with regard to Spain in the 
northwest. 
The causative agents engendering the expeditions during 
Bucareli's tenure remained consistent, if not constant. 
Equally important, yet touched on in none of the literature, 
the same can be said with regard to the late sixteenth-early 
seventeenth century voyages compared to their late 
eighteenth century counterparts. The lust for riches, for 
example, changed somewhat over two centuries in focus and 
intensity (dreams of a northern Cibola existed only 
unofficially). As reflected by the heroics of Bodega and 
Mourelle the will to adventure also continued to inspire 
mariners; and the vilification of Perez emphasizes the 
point. Ultimately however, the quintessential, vainglorious 
Spanish concern entailed protection of territory that it 
held to be its own; and Spain's success has necessarily been 
measured by historians in these terms. That historians have 
for the most part judged Perez, Hezeta, Bodega, and Arteaga 
by the standards of their own era, then, denotes an 
essential fairness to the grades. In this respect, any 
similarity, whether warranted or not, between the grades and 
the ''Great Men Make History'' school should be seen as 
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incidental, if not irrelevant. Yet there are problems with 
the approach northwest scholars have followed. 
To focus exclusively on the Spanish colonial 
weltenschauung as the appropriate lens through which to 
view--and grade--the mariners obfuscates the important 
didactic role history can play, by isolating Spain without 
reference to the larger international context. Moreover, it 
cloaks the past in unmerited romanticism, while essentially 
denying the realpolitik of the period. Spain's desire to add 
one more jewel--the Pacific Northwest--to her tarnished 
imperial crown ironically reflects the fundamental weakness 
of its political system, and how that system had become 
thoroughly anachronistic for a would-be great power by the 
late eighteenth century. 
Warren Cook concludes The Flood Tide of Empire by 
arguing that Spain's attempt and subsequent failure to 
secure the northwest signaled the apogee of its imperial 
growth and expansion.~ This argument, while essentially 
correct, geographically, is superficial, for it ignores all 
but the most obvious reason--Britain outgunned Spain in 
Europe--that doomed Spain's northwest coast venture to 
failure. Further, like other historians, Cook, by neglecting 
fully to acknowledge the link between the impetuses behind 
the Bucareli-directed voyages and those of the late 
sixteenth-early seventeenth century expeditions, fails to 
~See Cook's chapter, ''The Atrophy of Empire,'' 524-
37. 
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distinguish the crucial point that Spain's imperial designs 
had been, since the inept reigns of the first Hapsburg 
monarchs, stymied for two fundamental socio-economic 
reasons, which ultimately portended Spain's imperial apogee 
and atrophy. First, Spain's autocratic-mercantile nature 
precluded effective exploitation of the Pacific Northwest. 
And, second, Spain's non-Catholic European rivals--Britain, 
in particular--proved to be far more able to exploit 
economic opportunities, in short, out-competing the Iberian 
nation. 
Spain had made the mistake of assuming its New World 
economic successes occurred as the direct result of its 
method of conquest and exploitation. The accepted veracity 
of this erroneous notion grew in direct proportion to its 
longevity. The Bourbon Reforms, it should be recalled, aimed 
at improving a time-worn system, not fundamentally altering 
it. The basic structure of government did not change in 
Spain after the Bourbon dynasty replaced the Hapsburg line, 
or in New Spain until the revolution for independence in the 
early nineteenth century. Spain's colonial profits were the 
ironic result of an approach that enjoyed success in New 
Spain, for the most part, out of sheer coincidence. 
Throughout the colonial period Spain basically sought 
bullion from which it derived spiritual and economic 
sustenance, and found it aplenty in New Spain. The 
negligible effort required from the Spaniards, apart from 
establishing a way to exploit native labor, to extract the 
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riches reinforced a distinctly non-capitalist cultural 
imperative. Moreover, the positive correlation between the 
method employed and the results achieved the Spanish 
confused for cause and effect. New World gold and silver 
thus fueled the empire economically and spiritually, and 
engendered the political will necessary for expansion. 
That the expeditions discovered no conquerable or 
easily extractable supply of bullion on the northwest coast 
may or may not have influenced Spanish officials as to the 
region's attractiveness, but the fundamental issue that the 
lust for bullion illustrates is that Spaniards had not 
culturally developed, or adopted, another means by which to 
generate wealth. The Western world had changed dramatically 
since Columbus invaded the Americas, but Spain continued to 
live in the past. The Russians for decades had exploited the 
sea otter trade in the north, but the Spanish, because of 
restricted mercantile policies--indeed, one might accurately 
say, mercantile mentality--neither had encouraged 
exploitation of the trade nor had prepared its citizens to 
be able to identify and seize early capitalist 
opportunities. 
Increasingly hapless, Spain's economic fortunes had 
been born of a mercantile system thoroughly ossified by the 
late eighteenth century. Britain, on the other hand, adapted 
to and encouraged the creation of the emerging new world 
economic order, capitalism. The Bucareli voyages--their 
rasion de'etre, and accomplishments--stood in relation to 
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foreign designs on the northwest coast as Spain's moribund 
mercantile system stood in relation to emerging capitalism 
and Great Britain: destined to achieve less than ostensibly 
sought. 
Warren Cook also argues that had Spain been more 
vociferous in staking its claims to the northwest littoral, 
it might have held the region. Britain, he writes, found 
itself in no position to hold the territory, as Spanish 
firepower exceeded British in the northeast Pacific. 4 But 
again, Cook overlooks a crucial aspect of the Bucareli 
voyages. The limited scope of the expeditions--a total of 
five vessels sailed--in part reflects the insufficiency of 
funds available for such ventures; but more importantly, the 
meager financing illustrated a general lack of interest in 
Spain for the northwest coast of North America. The crown 
had an enormous empire to govern, and funds were necessarily 
allocated on a priority basis. Why had Spain squandered two 
centuries of potential discovery and occupation before 
deciding to return to the northwest coast in 1774? The 
answer is, for all the reasons heretofore discussed. To 
suggest that Spain could have defended the territory 
disingenuously romanticizes and distorts the crown's 
intentions. 
Viceroy Bucareli's role in the voyages, while his 
roughly nine years as secular regent of New Spain serve as 
traditional perimeters to border this study, proved to be of 
4 Cook, 525. 
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little consequence. Of his considerable merit as an 
administrator there is no doubt. Of his role, other than 
organizationally, in the expeditions there also is little 
doubt: a follower, albeit a very good one, the viceroy 
generated few original ideas. Visitador Jose de Galvez 
deserves most of the individual credit for launching the 
expeditions, but such recognition requires a caveat or runs 
the risk committing a non-sequitur in the manner of Chapman 
with Perez in California. Certainly, Galvez was the key 
figure, but the genesis of his plans were only a manifest 
reflection of the zeitgeist of the Enlightenment, of which 
he was a part and product. 
Moreover, crowning Bucareli, or Galvez, as ~~King of 
the Expeditions'' would at best be an empty title. After 
all, Spain got nothing for their efforts: no bullion; no 
profit from the fur-trade; and, few native-American 
converts. Finally, as Barrington explained the reasons for 
translating and publishing Mourelle's diary: 
I was principally induced to take this trouble, 
because I supposed, that the Spaniards, from their 
most peculiar jealousy with regard to their 
American dominions, would never permit that 
navigators of other countries (particularly the 
English) should know the excellent ports of the 
Western part of America.e 
Deeply ironic, the Spanish salvaged not even the glory of 
first discovery, which until recently all too often went to 
James Coi:•k. 
~ Barrington, 484-85. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
Because the 1770's Spanish voyages of discovery and 
exploration have received no discreet, full-length airing, 
determining where the voyages sit with regard to 
accomplishment requires drawing evidence from a variety of 
sources. The same sources have also been used as supporting 
documentation for this work. There is no disingenuity in 
this: we are not interested in what happened so much as to 
understand why what happened is thought to be important or 
not important. First, there exists what for the purposes of 
this essay will referred to as the ''regional'' history, 
where our subject is addressed with varying emphasis as part 
of larger projects. 
Bancroft provides good examples of the regional study 
in his histories of California (1884), ~laska (1886), and of 
the NorthHest Coast (1886-88), the latter being of the most 
interest. These comprehensive, seminal works necessarily 
examine figures such as Perez, Hezeta, Bodega, and Arteaga. 
Also in this group we can identify Charles Edward Chapman's 
oft cited and well documented histories of California (1913 
and 1928). John Caughey's history of California, although 
differing sharply with Chapman on the causative agents 
behind the voyages, is an excellent, carefully prepared work 
(1940). Irving B. Richman's history of California represents 
a third general-regional study of some interest (1965). Alan 
C. Hutchinson's study of the California frontier lends 
greater credence to Caughey's more complex presentation of 
the impetuses behind the voyages. Margaret A. Ormsby's 
textbook, British Columbia: ~History C1959l, does not for 
the most part rely on primary sources for its information, 
and in this sense is more typical of the northwest coast 
histories. This list is, of course, by no means exhaustive 
with regard to the body of historical literature of the 
several regions--it is not meant to be--rather, these works 
are important for this study because they all directly have 
offered opinions with regard to the voyages and their crews: 
Perez, Hezeta and Bodega, and Arteaga and Bodega have 
received greater or lesser amounts of scrutiny with varying 
conclusions reached. 
A second body of material can be drawn from sources 
focused more directly to the ''northwest coast''--and will 
be so referred to--but range in specificity, and in their 
interest for our subject. This group includes the re-issue 
of John Barrow's interesting examination of voyages to 
Arctic waters C1818). Henry Raup Wagner's exhaustive 
Cartography of the NorthHest Coast (1937) provides a wealth 
of information, yet, as is typical of Wagner's work, is 
steeped in minutiae and provides little synthesis. The 
remaining works focus without exception on the Nootka Sound 
controversy of the mid-1790's. While W.R. Manning's 1904 
report to the American Historical Association was published 
'31 
in periodical form Cthe Rmerican Historical RevieH, 1905) 
its comprehensive scope warrants notice here. Warren Cook's 
formidable 1973 Flood Tide of Empire clearly stands as the 
definitive work in this field. The work of Thomas Vaughan 
(as editor and contributing author, 1976), J. Arthur Lower 
(1978), Derek Pethick (1976 and 1980), Barry M. Gough 
(1980), and John Kendrick (1986) provide standard and 
satisfactory treatments of the Bucareli-directed voyages. 
All rely more or less heavily on secondary sources. Four 
masters theses can also be included in this group: Mildred 
DeLonchamp (Adams State College, 1946), Tomas Bartroli 
(University of British Columbia, 1960), Oakah L. Jones 
(University of Oklahoma, 1960), and Herbert K. Beals 
(Portland State University, 1983). Additionally, selected 
periodical literature labors in similar, if less 
comprehensive fashion: see William H. Galvani (1920), 
Lillian Estelle Fisher (1929), James G. Caster C1963l, 
Clinton R. Edwards (1964), Christon 1. Archer (1978-79), 
Eric Beerman (1982), and Janet R. Fireman (1987). Again, as 
was the case with the regional studies, this list does not 
exhaust all sources but it is representative of the salient 
conclusions reached with regard to the voyages discussed in 
this study. 
Finally, a last distinguishable group deals with the 
voyages in a ''peripheral'' way, as part of discreet 
inquiries tangentially related to our subject. These include 
works whose focuses lie elsewhere but find a discussion of 
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the voyages indispensable to their topics. They include the 
anguished prose of Herbert Ingram Priestley's otherwise 
commendable 1916 biography of Jose de Galvez. The seminal 
American borderlands historian Herbert Eugene Bolton's 1927 
study of Fray Juan Crespi is also instructive. Alf red 
Barnaby Thomas only briefly notes the northwest explorers in 
his Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New Spain 
(1941). Bernard E. Bobb's 1962 biography of Antonio Bucareli 
is a mature, well researched labor of love, and an 
invaluable source. The exemplary 1967 study of the Naval 
Station at San Blas by Michael E. Thurman examines the 
voyages and their captains in some detail. Finally, Robin 
Fisher touches on the expeditions in a 1977 study of the 
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